Trends in symptom validity, memory and psychological test performance as functions of time and malingering rating by McClain, Maryellen
   
 
 
 
 
 
Trends in Symptom Validity, Memory and Psychological Test Performance as 
Functions of Time and Malingering Rating 
 
 
A Thesis  
 
Submitted to the Faculty 
of  
Drexel University  
by  
Maryellen McClain 
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree  
of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
September 2003 
 
                                                                 1
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 ii
       
Dedication 
 
 This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Terri, who has provided the inspiration 
for this, and many other, achievements throughout my life.  
 
 
                                                                 iii
       
Acknowledgments 
 First, I would like to thank Doug Chute, Ph.D., my dissertation chair, graduate 
advisor, mentor and friend, for the support, direction, encouragement, and wisdom that he 
has provided me not only throughout this project, but also for the many years preceding 
it. I am especially grateful for his insights into the Zen of the Dissertation, and I can only 
hope that I have attained Dissertation Nirvana. I am also grateful to F. William Black, 
Ph.D., for his three years of mentorship, support, guidance and regular reports from Bill’s 
Travel Services. I thank him for piquing my interest in forensic neuropsychology, and for 
providing me with the kind of training in that area that only a true expert could give.  I 
would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Kirk Heilbrun, Ph.D., 
Pam Geller, Ph.D. and Phil Schatz, Ph.D., for their consistent support and constructive 
feedback, which have helped to shape my thinking about this project. 
 I am also grateful to my family and friends, who have been there for me through all 
the disappointment, anxiety, frustration and formatting crises that invariably accompany 
projects of this magnitude. I am certain that they are pleased that they no longer have to 
ask me “are you done with school yet?”  
 Finally, I am grateful to my mom, whose unwavering faith has sustained me 
through so much.   
   
                                                                 iv
       
Table of Contents 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………....……..vi  
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………...vii 
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………….viii 
1. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………1 
1.1 Subtypes of Memory………………………………………………………4 
 1.2 Memory Functioning in Selected Populations…………………………….7  
   1.2.1 Normal Subjects……………………………………………….......7 
   1.2.2 Chronic Pain……………………………………………………….8 
  1.2.3 Acquired Brain Injury…………..............................……................9  
 1.3 Neuropsychological Assessment of Memory.…………………………...15 
   1.3.1 Wechsler Memory Scale.………………………………………...15 
 1.3.2 Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test…………………………......17 
 1.3.3 California Verbal Learning Test ………………………………...18 
1.4 Neuropsychological Assessment in the Forensic Setting……………......21 
  1.4.1 Diagnostic Criteria for Malingering………………………….......23 
   1.4.2 Differential Diagnosis in the Assessment of Malingering……….24     
   1.4.3 Assessment of Mood and Emotional Functioning……………….26 
 1.5 Assessment Methods in the Detection of Malingering…………………..35    
   1.5.1 Symptom Validity Testing……………………………………….35  
   1.5.2 Unusual Response Styles…………………………………….......46 
   1.5.3 Pattern Analysis………………………………………………….49 
   1.5.4 Comprehensive Methods…………………………………….......53  
                                                                 v
       
1.6 Effects of Coaching on Neuropsychological Test Performance……....…55    
1.7 Special Considerations in Malingering Research………………………..62  
1.8 Aims of the Current Study……………………………………………….64  
1.9 Method……………………………………………………………….......68  
   1.9.1 Subjects…………………………………………………………..68  
   1.9.2 Measures……………………………………………………........69  
   1.9.3 Analysis…………………………………………………….…….72 
2. RESULTS…………………………………………………………….……………78 
         2.1 General Demographics of the Sample…………………………………...79 
2.2 Symptom Validity Test Performance Over Time………………………..82 
2.2.1 Rey 15 Item Test…………………… ………………...…………82 
2.2.2 The Test of Memory Malingering……..…………………………84 
              2.2.3 The Word Memory Test…………………………………….........88 
                        2.2.4 The California Verbal Learning Test Yes/No Hits 
 Subtest……………………………………………………………91 
 
2.3 Performance on the MMPI-2 Validity and Clinical Scales  
            (F, Hs, D, Hy, Pt), Beck Depression Inventory –  
            Second Edition, and Beck Anxiety Inventory as a Function  
            of Malingering Rating……………………………………………92 
 
2.4 Evaluation of Verbal Memory Test Performance as a  
            Function of Malingering Rating…………………………….……93 
 
2.5 Evaluation of Visual Reproduction Recognition Memory  
     Test Performance as a Function of Malingering Rating………...96 
 
 2.6 Neuropsychological Symptom Checklist Memory Problem 
Scores as a Function of Malingering Rating…………………..…97  
 
3.      DISCUSSION...………………………………………………………………..…100 
4. LIST OF REFERENCES………………………………………………...............110 
                                                                 vi
       
5. APPENDIX A: CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING  
 PROBABILITY………………………………………………………………….125 
 
6. VITA…………………………………………………………………….…..........127   
  
                                                                 vii
       
       List of Tables 
 
1.  Demographic Data for the Total Sample….………………………………...…...80 
 
2.   Demographic Data for Subject Samples by Tests Administered…………….......81 
 
3.   Pairwise Comparisons of Malingering Rating Scores for the TOMM  
   Trial 1………………………………………………………….………..……......86 
 
4.   Pairwise Comparisons of Malingering Rating Scores for the TOMM  
   Trial 2…………………………………………………………………..…….….87 
                                                                 viii
       
 
List of Figures 
 
1.   Rey 15 Item Test Scores by Year of Administration………………...…...…..….83 
 
2.   Distribution of TOMM Trial 1 Scores for Years 1999 through 2000……..…..…85 
 
3.   Distribution of TOMM Trial 2 Scores for Years 1999 through 2000………....…88 
 
4.   Distribution of Word Memory Test Immediate Recognition Scores  
   for Years 2001 through 2002………………………………………………....….90 
 
5.   Distribution of Word Memory Test Delayed Recognition Scores for  
     Years 2001 through 2002…………………………………….……………...……90 
 
6.   Distribution of Word Memory Test Consistency Scores for Years  
   2001 through 2002………………………………………………..………..…….91 
 
7.   Distribution of CVLT-II Yes/No Hits Scores for Years 2001 through 2002……92 
 
8.   Distribution of WMS-III Auditory Recognition Delayed Index Scores by  
   Malingering Rating…………………………………………………..………..…95 
 
9.   Distribution of CVLT-II Yes/No Hits by Malingering Rating………....…..……95 
 
10. Distribution of WMS-III Visual Reproduction Scores by Malingering 
Rating ………………………………………………………….………………..97 
 
11. Distribution of Neuropsychological Symptom Checklist Scores by  
      Malingering Rating …………………………………………………………..….99 
 
 
                                                                 ix
       
Abstract 
Trends in Symptom Validity, Memory and Psychological Test Performance as Functions 
of Time and Malingering Rating 
Maryellen McClain 
Douglas L. Chute, Ph.D.  
 
 
 
Detection of malingered or exaggerated cognitive deficits has received considerable 
attention within the neuropsychological literature in the recent past. Methods to detect 
such phenomena have been developed, including specific tests of malingering as well as 
methods by which to analyze data from existing tests. Questions regarding the utility of 
these various methods continue to be debated within the field, and neuropsychologists 
have speculated that litigating patients are being made aware of specific malingering 
detection methods by attorneys as well as Internet websites devoted to such topics. It was 
hypothesized that scores on symptom validity measures would normalize over time, with 
fewer subjects classified as malingering based on their scores on these tests, ostensibly 
due to prior knowledge of their content and purpose. In addition, significant differences 
were expected to emerge on tests specific tests of memory using a recognition format as a 
function of clinical judgment of rating probability. Patients rated as malingerers were 
expected to exaggerate symptoms of emotional distress with significantly greater 
frequency than patients rated as not malingering, as evidenced by their responses to the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – Second Edition (MMPI-II), the Beck 
Depression Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), 
and were expected to make significantly more subjective complaints of memory 
dysfunction than those patients rated as non-malingerers. Archival data collected on 1290 
subjects between 1999 and 2003 were examined in this study, and were extracted from 
                                                                 x
       
the Tulane University Neuropsychology Laboratory database. Non-parametric statistical 
procedures were used, due to the non-normal distribution of the data, and included 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance procedures and follow-up Mann-Whitney U tests for 
all pairwise comparisons. The results failed to support the expected trends toward normal 
scores for the symptom validity measures. However, scores on tests of recognition 
memory for verbal and visual materials, as well as on the BAI and the Hs and Hy scales 
of the MMPI-2 were significantly lower for those subjects rated as absolute malingerers 
compared to those rated as not malingering The rate of subjective complaints of memory 
dysfunction was similar for all subjects.  
                                                                 1
       
1: Background and Literature Review 
 Prior to the advent of modern neuroradiological tools, neuropsychological 
assessment provided one of the few means by which organic brain disease and its effects 
could be diagnosed and described. With the development of more sophisticated and 
accurate methods for the diagnosis of structural brain pathology, such as computerized 
tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), the role of neuropsychological 
assessment has evolved to take on more specific diagnostic challenges, such as 
differentiating between subtypes of disorders, the diagnosis of conditions in which gross 
structural abnormalities cannot be visualized by existing radiological methods, examining 
the impact of psychiatric disturbances on cognitive functioning, and determination of 
disability. The results obtained from such assessments have contributed to ongoing 
research that has significantly increased our understanding of the brain-behavior 
relationships with which Neuropsychology is concerned. As a result, more, and more 
refined, neuropsychological assessment techniques have been developed.  
Although many neuropsychologists have typically functioned within a traditional 
diagnostic and treatment-oriented clinical setting, more and more clinicians are being 
drawn into the forensic arena. This is especially true regarding cases of personal injury, 
as an appreciation of Neuropsychology’s contributions to the understanding of cognitive 
functioning after acquired brain injury has grown within the legal community. Within this 
relatively new domain of practice, the neuropsychologist has been called upon to address 
such issues as the establishment of causal relationships between the alleged accident and 
resulting injuries, the impact of premorbid cognitive status on current functioning, and to 
predict the likelihood that cognitive sequelae of such injuries are either permanent or 
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temporary. Neuropsychological tests are used to establish the severity and permanence of 
acquired brain injury in such civil litigation cases, in which very large monetary 
settlements are at often at stake. The neuropsychologist has also been called upon to 
examine the veracity of patient complaints and to make statements regarding the patient’s 
level of effort and cooperation during the assessment. The methods by which such 
examinations are accomplished have been the subject of much interest within the domain 
of forensic neuropsychological practice, and research in this area has grown considerably 
in the recent past.   
According to Brandt (1988), memory dysfunction constitutes the most common 
complaint after brain injury or neurological illness. Williams (1998) asserts that problems 
with memory in such circumstances are common knowledge to the general public, via 
frequent depictions of amnesia and related memory disorders that follow a blow to the 
head. For that reason, the general public may have a relatively better understanding of the 
manifestations of memory disorder than of any other cognitive disorders. As a 
consequence, persons sustaining such injuries may be more likely to feign the presence of 
memory impairment, even if that injury does not result in an injury to the brain.  
Alternatively, such patients may also exaggerate real deficits, and the clinician is often 
called upon to distinguish between these phenomena.  
As noted by Iverson and Binder (2000, p. 829), “neuropsychological assessment 
involves collecting information in the form of symptom reporting and test performance. 
Both of these types of information can be controlled by a patient who wishes to appear 
impaired”.  In an effort to capture such phenomena, the development of tests and 
assessment techniques to examine symptom validity has become a major endeavor in 
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Neuropsychology. The success of these methods and tests continues to fall under 
scrutiny; however, as seen in a professional literature that is fraught with equivocal 
results and a wide variety of opinion regarding the optimal method for the detection of 
manufactured or exaggerated complaints. While much of the research published to date 
has been concerned with the utility of different detection methods in generally well-
controlled situations, there have been no studies that have examined the utility of 
symptom validity tests over time. There have been concerns that litigating patients 
referred for neuropsychological assessment are being coached, ostensibly by their 
attorneys, regarding specific tests and malingering detection methods that may be used in 
the test battery. Also of concern is the growing body of information pertaining to 
neuropsychological assessment methods that is available on the Internet, some of which 
presents specific test items as well as tips and strategies to avoid the detection of feigned 
deficits. As a result, there are concerns that the methods by which malingering and/or 
symptom exaggeration have been assessed are becoming less effective, due to the wider 
availability and dissemination of otherwise proprietary test information.  
 This study examined the utility of some of the methods used to assess symptom 
validity and malingering in a large sample of litigating and non-litigating patients with a 
variety of diagnostic backgrounds in an attempt to provide valuable information in this 
growing area of study.  
As noted previously, memory deficits are considered to be the most frequently 
malingered symptom of cognitive dysfunction (Williams, 1998). Therefore, an 
understanding of memory, in both normal and impaired subjects, is necessary. The 
following section provides a brief overview of memory subtypes, and is followed by a 
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discussion of memory functioning in selected populations (“normal” subjects, chronic 
pain patients, and traumatic brain injury patients). Subsequent sections pertaining to 
objective tests of memory, discussion of pertinent assessment issues in the context of 
forensic work, assessment methods designed to detect malingering, and the effects of 
both psychiatric disturbance and coaching on memory and test performance. Special 
considerations in malingering research are also discussed.  
 
1.1. Subtypes of Memory 
 According to Lezak (1995, pg. 27), “central to all cognitive functions and 
probably to all that is characteristically human in a person’s behavior is the capacity for 
memory and learning”. Considering the relative importance of memory within the scope 
of human cognition, it is of little surprise that the capacity to acquire, retain and recall 
information has been the subject of considerable interest and study for quite some time. 
For example, Dikmen et al. (1987) note that memory functioning after brain injury has 
been the subject of investigation more than any other cognitive ability, likely due to its 
complexity and its importance in daily life and for survival. This undertaking has been 
difficult; however, as memory has long been appreciated as one of the most complex 
aspects of brain functioning (Luria, 1981). Memory does not exist as a unitary cognitive 
construct, nor is it considered to be localized completely to a single, discrete brain 
structure (Filley, 1995). Comprehensive examination of memory; therefore, must take 
into account its various facets and examine each of these both individually and in 
combination. The ability to conduct a thorough assessment of memory functions is of 
particular importance in the context of brain impairment; as such examinations provide 
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the clinician with the ability to fully delineate the patient’s current level of memory 
functioning, and to make diagnostic and prognostic inferences based on the obtained 
results.   
The assessment of memory generally encompasses the examination of immediate, 
short-term, and long-term functions, which describe those abilities that allow for 
information to be held momentarily, to be held for several minutes to days, or which refer 
to the storage of memories for very extended periods of time, such as years. References 
to “learning” generally pertain to the amount of information that is maintained for more 
immediate use; whereas the term “memory” is applied to information that has been stored 
and is, theoretically, available for retrieval at a later time (Squire, 1987). Within the 
domain of immediate memory lies the concept of working memory, as described by 
Baddeley (1992), and which pertains to the patient’s ability to not only hold information 
on a short term basis, but to mentally manipulate that information according to task 
demands. Theoretically, the working memory model encompasses separate systems that 
allow for the retention and processing of verbal and non-verbal information, termed the 
phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad, respectively.  
Additional delineations include distinctions between declarative memory, which 
encompasses the patient’s recollection of previously presented information, and 
procedural memory, which describes memory for skills and actions. Semantic memory 
includes the patient’s knowledge of common facts and general information, whereas 
episodic memory contains information pertaining to specific events. A distinction is also 
made between explicit and implicit memory, with the former encompassing conscious 
recollection as opposed to the unconscious nature of the latter. Finally, amnestic patients 
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are often described in terms of the degree of retrograde memory loss, which describes 
the degree to which memories acquired before the injury have been lost. In contrast, 
anterograde amnesia is concerned with the patient’s inability to acquire new information 
(O’Connor & Morin, 1998). In patients with true amnesia, deficits are generally seen in 
declarative, episodic and explicit memory, and anterograde amnesia is often present. 
However, these patients often demonstrate intact procedural, semantic and implicit 
memory, with variations in the degree of retrograde amnesia. These patterns can be of use 
to the clinician who is attempting to determine the veracity of a patient’s complaints of 
memory dysfunction.  
Despite the ability to delineate subtypes of memory disorder, questions pertaining 
to the ability of the clinician to determine the validity of the observed memory disorder 
have received considerable attention. Schacter (1986) proposed that a subjects’ feeling-
of-knowing, or their subjective sense that they would be able to recall a forgotten event if 
provided specific clues in specific contexts, and this construct proved useful in 
discriminating real from feigned amnestics when this hypothesis was examined 
empirically. The results indicated that subjects simulating amnesia tended to minimize 
their ability to recall specific information, despite the provision of clues, whereas genuine 
amnestics reported that clues would likely facilitate recall. These results suggested that 
subjects simulating amnesia did so based on their best guess regarding the nature of true 
memory loss, which is generally inconsistent with what was expected by these pseudo-
amnestics.   
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1.2. Memory Functioning in Selected Populations 
 
1.2.1. “Normal” Subjects 
 
  The degree to which normal subjects endorse cognitive and behavioral symptoms 
suggestive of central nervous system (CNS) dysfunction has been previously studied 
(Gouvier, Uddo-Crane & Brown, 1988; Wong, Regennitter & Barrios, 1994), with up to 
47 percent of normal subjects endorsing some type of cognitive abnormality. In a sample 
of medical outpatients with no history of CNS impairment, 62 percent complained of 
headaches, 26 percent complained of problems with concentration, 20 percent cited 
memory problems and 16 percent complained of confusion (Lees-Haley & Brown, 1993). 
These findings suggest that a wide variety of cognitive problems, including complaints of 
abnormal memory, are endorsed in surprisingly large segments of the general population, 
presumably in persons without previous head injuries or other forms of neurological 
impairment.  
Patterns of memory test performance have also been useful in distinguishing 
memory changes resulting from organic impairment from those related to normal aging 
(Morley, Haxby & Lundgren, 1980). Specifically, dissociation between working memory 
and memory for information that has already been acquired has been described (Craik, 
1977), in which normal elderly subjects are able to hold relatively simple information in 
working memory, but demonstrate abnormal spontaneous recall that is believed to result 
from problems with the ability to encode information. Not surprisingly, successful 
performance on working memory tasks appears to be inversely related to task difficulty, 
with poorer performances on tasks requiring recall of more complex information. 
Problems with acquisition have been correlated with a decline in cognitive functions in 
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general, resulting in less efficient strategies for encoding material that must be 
remembered (Sanders et al., 1980). Problems with retrieval also appear to be related to 
this generalized decrease in cognitive efficiency, resulting in less efficient retrieval of 
information and a reduced ability to utilize cues to facilitate recall (Craik, 1977). 
Palmer et al. (1998) examined the degree to which cognitive problems occur in 
normal elderly subjects. Using a comprehensive, flexible neuropsychological test battery, 
73 percent of their group of 132 older (aged 50-79) subjects performed within the 
Borderline Range on at least one cognitive test, while 37 percent of the sample generated 
at least one score in the Impaired Range.  However, only five percent of the sample 
generated scores that were consistently within the Impaired Range. Within the domain of 
memory, only 0.8 percent of the sample was consistently within the Borderline Range 
and none was consistently within the Impaired Range.  Therefore, the authors caution that 
false positive interpretations of cognitive impairment are possible in otherwise normal 
subjects, without consideration of these, and similar, base rates.  
 
1.2.2. Chronic Pain 
Patients diagnosed with chronic pain have been found to make subjective 
complaints of cognitive dysfunction, with approximately 42 percent of patients making 
such complaints in one sample (Iverson & McCracken, 1997). Additional analysis of this 
sample revealed that 39 percent of the patients met criteria for a diagnosis of 
Postconcussive Disorder, according to the diagnostic criteria set forth in the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), even though none of the patients had any 
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history of head injury. These findings suggest that complaints of memory dysfunction are 
often non-specific. 
Iverson et al. (2001) examined the rate of cognitive complaints in litigating and 
non-litigating chronic pain patients, as well as patients with acquired brain injury. In their 
sample, the non-litigating chronic pain patients comprised the group making the fewest 
complaints of cognitive dysfunction, whereas the pain patients seeking Workman’s 
Compensation payments complained of more cognitive problems than a group of non-
litigating patients with documented brain injuries. The authors caution; however, that 
their results may have been affected by the fact that the non-litigating pain patients were 
all candidates for surgical implantation of dorsal column stimulators and, in the context 
of pre-surgical psychological evaluations, may have denied any form of dysfunction so as 
to not jeopardize their chances of receiving this potentially pain-reducing device. 
Conversely, the patients involved in litigation or Workman’s Compensation proceedings 
may have perceived the need to appear impaired in order to justify their requests for 
financial compensation. These findings raise an important issue within the domain of 
self-report of cognitive impairment, namely, that such complaints may often be spurious 
and motivated by external factors.   
 
1.2.3. Acquired Brain Injury 
Although patients can suffer from any number of problems associated with brain 
injuries, those that occur within the cognitive and neurobehavioral domains are 
considered to account for the majority of the deficits that endure over time (Brooks, 
1986). In particular, memory functioning after acquired traumatic brain injury has been 
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the subject of considerable research, with many studies concerned with the extent and 
course of recovery of memory as a function of injury severity. The Glasgow Coma Scale 
(GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974) is generally used to evaluate and objectify the patient’s 
level of consciousness, and is considered by some to be a useful assessment of injury 
severity in patients with altered consciousness (Lezak, 1995, p. 755). The scale provides 
criteria for the assessment of the patient’s ability to open their eyes, and to respond 
verbally and motorically, according to the level of input of stimuli from the examiner 
(from verbal commands to infliction of pain). Scores are generated from this assessment, 
with scores equal to or above 13 indicative of coma duration of less than or equal to 20 
minutes, corresponding to a mild level of brain injury. Moderately severe brain injuries 
manifest coma duration of 21 minutes to six hours, and scores of 9 to 12 on the GCS. 
Those injuries classified as severe demonstrate coma duration of longer than six hours 
and GCS scores of 8 down to 3. The GCS can be administered on a repeated basis in 
order to track the depth and length of coma, with longer and deeper comatose states 
associated with more severe brain injuries (Dikmen, et al., 1986a; Dikmen et al., 1990.).  
While the ability to determine the severity of brain injury is of considerable 
significance, the ability to determine the degree to which patients recover cognitive 
functioning after such an injury is also important. In that regard, the base rates of 
cognitive impairment after brain injury must be considered, in order to provide a basis 
against which to compare neuropsychological test data from an individual patient. Failure 
to do so often results in over or under diagnosis of organic impairment (Larrabee, 2000) 
and erroneous conclusions regarding the etiology of the patient’s cognitive problems. In a 
comprehensive study of 436 brain injured adults, Dikmen et al. (1995) demonstrated that, 
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at one year post-injury, their sample of severely brain -injured patients was significantly 
more impaired on all cognitive measures, including memory tests, than patients for whom 
mild brain injuries had been documented. Moreover, those patients whose injuries were 
within the mild range, according to their initial rating on the GCS, generated scores on 
cognitive tests, including memory measures, that were not significantly different from the 
control group, which was comprised of patients who had sustained trauma to body parts 
other than the head. In fact, the authors state, “significant neuropsychological impairment 
due to a mild head injury is as unlikely as is escaping impairment in the case of a very 
severe head injury” (Dikmen et al., p. 87). These findings were consistent with other 
studies that suggested that mild brain injuries, defined as those in which the patient’s 
GCS score ranged from 13 to the maximum of 15, are not associated with persistent 
neuropsychological deficits (Dikmen, McLean & Temkin, 1986b; Levin, et al., 1987; 
Maddocks & Saling, 1996). While Brandt (1988) notes that head injury patients complain 
most frequently of problems with memory, it has also been demonstrated that moderately 
to severely injured brain injury patients tend to underestimate the severity of their 
deficits, due mainly to decreased self-awareness (Sherer et al., 1998a; Sherer et al., 
1998b) and may; therefore, report fewer problems than those with less severe, or no, 
brain impairment. This pattern of self-report may be useful in discriminating patients 
with such injuries from those who falsely report such symptoms, or exaggerate milder 
cognitive problems.   
While the presence of cognitive impairments, such as slowed speed of 
information processing, attention, and memory, have been documented in mild brain 
injury patients assessed up to one week post injury (Maddocks & Saling, 1996; Levin et 
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al., 1987), other studies have demonstrate that, in up to 96 percent of such patients, these 
problems are largely resolved within approximately three months of the injury (Dikmen 
et al., 1986a; Binder, Rohling & Larrabee, 1997). The base rate of persistent cognitive 
deficits in patients sustaining mild brain injuries has been estimated to be approximately 
five percent, suggesting that it would be very likely that a diagnosis of persistent deficit 
(beyond three months) that is directly attributable to the injury would be incorrect 
(Binder, Rohling & Larrabee, 1997). Despite these findings, it has also been noted that a 
subset of mild brain injury patients complain of persistent cognitive impairment and, 
according to Mittenberg and Strauman (2000), these patients are more likely to pursue 
litigation than the majority of mild brain injury patients. The descriptive classification of 
Postconcussion Syndrome (hereafter referred to as PCS) is often applied to such patients. 
As defined by the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems, 10th Edition (World Health Organization, 1992), PCS requites the presence of 
problems in three or more categories including emotional disturbance, subjective 
complaint of cognitive problems despite a lack of such findings on formal assessment; 
headache, noise intolerance and vestibular disturbance; insomnia and alcohol intolerance. 
A preoccupation with these problems, suggestive of Hypochondriasis, is also part of the 
disorder and is accompanied by a fear of permanent brain damage and adoption of the 
sick role. The presence of depression and anxiety, borne out of fear of the possible 
permanence of the cognitive dysfunction, is considered to perpetuate the patient’s 
problems. The patient’s involvement in litigation is not; however, associated completely 
with the presence of the syndrome, according to the diagnostic criteria. The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – IV (APA, 1994) also provides criteria for a 
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diagnosis of PCS.  These criteria require a history of head trauma resulting in a loss of 
consciousness, posttraumatic amnesia, or seizures, evidence of abnormalities in attention 
or memory as documented on neuropsychological testing. The DSM-IV and also requires 
that three or more symptoms either begin shortly after the injury or are an exacerbation of 
previous symptoms, and which persist for at least three months. These symptoms include 
those described in the ICD-10 criteria, but also include personality changes, apathy and 
lack of spontaneity.  
The validity of the PCS diagnosis has been the subject of ongoing debate in 
neuropsychology, with some clinicians maintaining that the homogeneity of PCS 
symptoms suggests an organic etiology (Binder, 1996), while others implicate a purely 
psychogenic basis (Bohnen, Jolles & Twinjstra, 1992; Youngjohn, Burrows & Erdal, 
1995), and still others state that while the initial problems may result from neurological 
insult, the patient’s perception of persistent cognitive problems is psychologically-based 
(Mittenberg & Strauman, 2000). It has been demonstrated that patients who have 
sustained some form of non-physical trauma (non-brain injuries or emotional trauma) 
report similar rates of PCS symptoms when compared to mild brain injury patients (Lees-
Haley, Fox & Courtney, 2001). Furthermore, the presence of PCS-like symptoms has 
been found to vary on a daily basis in non-brain injured subjects, in relation to the 
subject’s perceived stress level (Gouvier, et al., 1992).  The presence of PCS symptoms 
has also been documented in the general population (Gouvier, Uddo-Crane & Brown, 
1988; Mittenberg, Tremont & Zielinski, 1996; Lees-Haley & Brown, 1993).  
Information regarding the patient’s subjective perception of their cognitive 
problems is also important in neuropsychological evaluation, as it provides additional 
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information to which the test data can be compared. However, the validity of the patient’s 
self-report of such problems is often of questionable validity. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the forensic setting, in which many patients undergo neuropsychological 
evaluation in an effort to document the presence of problems that, if validated and 
deemed permanent, may be deserving of significant financial compensation. Using a self-
report checklist of 37 possible problems, Lees-Haley and Brown (1993) found that 
personal injury claimants endorsed significantly more symptoms of PCS and other 
problems than a control group of general medical patients who were not involved in 
litigation. It is interesting to note that, in this litigating sample, the most commonly 
reported problem was anxiety or nervousness (93 percent of the sample), while sleep 
disturbance, depression and headaches were also endorsed by more than 80 percent of 
these respondents. Only 53 percent of the litigating sample, which was claiming 
significant cognitive impairment due to head trauma, reported memory problems; this 
was considered to be a relatively low number given that memory problems constitute the 
most frequently reported sequelae of acquired brain injury, as noted previously (Brandt, 
1988). Additionally, Fee & Rutherford, 1988 demonstrated that, while litigating and non-
litigating patients reported similar rates of PCS symptoms at six weeks after injury, the 
rate of reported symptoms in non-litigating subjects was significantly lower than their 
litigating peers, even when this latter group reached settlement of their lawsuits. Several 
authors (Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993; Trueblood, 1994; Binder et al., 1993) have found 
that litigating patients who perform below acceptable levels on malingering tests also 
tend to generate lower memory test scores than patients whose brain injuries have been 
verified and who are not involved in litigation. In addition, their memory test 
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performances tend to fall below those of litigating patients who perform within 
acceptable limits on tests of malingering. Based on such findings, Lees-Haley and Brown 
(1993) caution that patient self-report of cognitive dysfunction must be viewed with a 
skeptical eye, especially within the context of a forensic neuropsychological evaluation.     
 
1.3. Neuropsychological Assessment of Memory 
 Given that memory dysfunction “is commonly reported in individuals diagnosed 
with a wide variety of neurological, psychiatric and developmental disorders” (Wechsler, 
1997, p. 1), the need for methods to comprehensively assess memory is of utmost 
importance. To meet that need, a number of test instruments specific to the assessment of 
memory have been developed, with revised versions of some of these tests now available 
that attempt to incorporate additional methods by which to assess memory. A brief 
summary of some of the more commonly used instruments is provided here. 
 
1.3.1. Wechsler Memory Scale 
 The revised version of the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-R) was introduced in 
1987, and was described as “an individually administered, clinical instrument for 
appraising major dimensions of memory functions in adolescents and adults” (Wechsler, 
1987, p. 1). Although presented as a single instrument, the WMS-R is essentially a 
battery of individual tests designed to examine multiple aspects of memory functioning, 
and represents a significant expansion and refinement of the original Wechsler Memory 
Scale (Wechsler, 1945). The WMS-R allows the clinician to differentially examine the 
patient’s immediate memory functioning within the auditory and visual domains, and also 
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provides indices of general memory, delayed memory and attention/concentration. 
Normative studies conducted with the WMS-R in a sample of 20 brain-injured patients 
demonstrated that, as a group, these patients performed at generally lower levels 
compared to normal subjects. In particular, brain injured subjects generated Delayed 
Memory Index scores that were significantly lower than their General Memory Index 
scores, suggesting relatively greater problems with recall after a time delay. In addition, 
the Delayed Memory Index for the brain-injured sample was significantly lower than the 
mean Attention/Concentration Index for this group, further illustrating problems with 
learning and spontaneous recall. A substantial revision of the WMS-R was completed in 
1997, resulting in the introduction of the Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition 
(WMS-III). According to the manual (Wechsler, 1997, p. 1), the WMS-III is “an 
individually administered battery of learning, memory, and working memory measures”. 
This description highlights the changes in the conceptualization of memory functioning 
that occurred in the 10 years between the publication of these two instruments, including 
the emphasis on the concept of working memory as a measure of information processing 
capacity. Also, subtests designed to examine differences in performance on recall versus 
recognition measures were added to allow the clinician to more fully examine specific 
problems with the retrieval of information that would, hopefully, aid in the differential 
diagnosis of subtypes of memory disorders. Results of the normative studies conducted 
with brain injured subjects indicated that, as a group, these patients demonstrated mild 
problems with encoding and storage of information, especially within the visual domain, 
but were average with respect to the ability to discriminate target information from foils 
on recognition-based subtests. This latter finding is of particular interest, as the use of 
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recognition memory tests has received increasing attention in the symptom validity 
literature. An appreciation of typical patterns of performance on such tests in both normal 
and neurologically impaired subjects is needed, in order to provide a standard against 
which the recognition memory test performances of subjects believed to be malingering 
can be compared.  
Like its immediate predecessor, the WMS-III is a comprehensive battery of tests 
designed to measure immediate and delayed memory in both the verbal and visual 
domains. Eight index scores are calculated from this test data, including the Auditory 
Recognition Delayed Index (ARD), which provides a measure of the patient’s ability to 
discriminate target verbal information from foils, and represents the combination of two 
of the verbal subtests found on the WMS-III (Logical Memory-II Recognition and Verbal 
Paired Associates-II Recognition). The Recognition portion of the Visual Reproduction-II 
subtest is used to examine the patient’s recognition memory for non-verbal materials; in 
this case, a set of five geometric designs of increasing complexity. These scores (ARD 
and the Visual Reproduction-II Recognition subtest) are of particular interest in this 
study, as both provide measures of recognition memory. 
 
1.3.2. Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test 
 This list learning task (RAVLT; Rey, 1964) was designed to measure immediate 
memory span, learning over repeated trials, the presence or absence of learning strategies, 
and the incidence and effects of proactive and/or retroactive interference in addition to 
the degree of short-term and long-term recall. The target list consists of 15 unrelated 
words that are read to the patient over five consecutive learning trials, followed by an 
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interference trial also consisting of 15 words, a sixth trial testing recall of the target list, a 
delayed recall trial of target list items administered 30 minutes after initial presentation, 
and a recognition trial testing the patient’s ability to discriminate target list items from 
foils.  
 Normative studies using the RAVLT indicate that normal subjects typically 
demonstrate increased acquisition of the target list over the five learning trials (Selnes et 
al., 1991), with recall on the interference trial falling an average of one to two words 
below recall on trial V, and approximately the same amount of loss between trial V and 
VI (Lezak, 1995). Lezak (1995, p. 442) notes, “marked variations from this pattern will 
usually reflect some dysfunction of the memory system”. The use of this test with brain-
injured patients has demonstrated that, in general, such patients demonstrate some 
acquisition over the five learning trials with poor delayed recall, but are generally within 
normal limits in their performance on the recognition memory trial (Bigler et al., 1989).  
 
1.3.3. California Verbal Learning Test 
The California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT; Delis, et al., 1987) was developed to 
provide “a brief, individually administered assessment of multiple strategies and 
processes involved in learning and remembering verbal material” (Delis, et al, 1987, p. 
1). The test presents the patient with a list of 16 words from four different semantic 
categories (i.e. spices, articles of clothing, tools and fruits) over five consecutive learning 
trials. Recall is tested immediately following each presentation of the list. An interference 
trial, consisting of a different list of 16 semantically related words, is administered 
immediately after completion of the initial five learning trials. Measures of free and cued 
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recall are administered immediately after completion of the interference trial, and again 
after a 20-minute delay. A recognition memory trial is also administered after completion 
of the cued delayed recall trial. Additional scores pertaining to the subject’s ability to 
discriminate target words from foils (Discriminability) and their tendency to respond 
either affirmatively or negatively on the recognition trial (Response Bias) are also 
calculated. 
The CVLT, in its original form, provides a wealth of information regarding 
specific aspects of a patient’s ability to acquire, retain and recall verbal information. 
Within the province of malingering assessment, particular attention has been paid to 
differences between spontaneous recall and recognition of the list elements. As noted in 
the test manual (p. 27), “recognition testing maximally aids retrieval, whereas cued-recall 
testing provides a lesser degree of assistance. In contrast, free recall provides no 
assistance”. Therefore, it would be expected that those patients experiencing problems 
with retrieval would benefit from information provided in a recognition format. Those 
patients who cannot encode information (amnestics) would be expected to perform 
poorly on both recall and recognition trials. Both scenarios provide guidelines for 
expected patterns of performance on this test. Research using the CVLT has been 
conducted with a multitude of special populations in order to examine such patterns. 
Crosson et al. (1988) demonstrated that severely brain injured patients were able to 
generate learning curves similar to normal controls, but acquired less information per trial 
than their normal control counterparts. The brain injured patients also recalled 
significantly fewer total words than normals on delayed recall, and also performed below 
normals on the recognition trial; however, the brain injured patients’ scores demonstrated 
                                                                 20
       
that they derived benefit from the provision of cues on this trial. No differences were 
found; however, between patient and controls with respect to response bias, defined as 
the tendency to respond with either “yes” or “no” to individual test items on the 
recognition trial.  Novack et al. found similar effects (1995) in another sample of severely 
brain-injured patients. Depressed patients have also been found to score below normal 
levels on all CVLT indices, but their performance tends to improve on the recognition 
trial (Massman et al., 1992).  
A revision of the CVLT, the CVLT-II, was completed in 2000, and incorporated 
several changes to the original test format, including a larger sample (1087 subjects 
compared to 273 for the CVLT). Additional changes include word lists that were 
comprised of more familiar words, a short form for more severely impaired patients with 
limited tolerance for testing, and the addition of a forced-choice recognition trial to aid in 
the assessment of suboptimal effort or malingering.   The CVLT-II, as noted previously, 
is used as a measure of the patient’s ability to acquire, retain, and recall verbal 
information both immediately and after a time delay, in much the same manner as the 
RAVLT and the original CVLT. However, the word lists used in the CVLT and CVLT-II 
can be organized into four semantically related lists (i.e. vegetables, tools, items of 
clothing, modes of transportation) that, theoretically, provide a structure that facilitates 
recall of individual list items. The revised version of the CVLT is distinguished from the 
original by the inclusion of several new subtests, including a yes/no recognition subtest 
examining recognition memory for List A (target) items. In this subtest, which is 
administered at the end of the test, the patient is read a list of 16 word pairs, with each 
pair containing a target word from List A and a foil. The patient is required to identify the 
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word that was presented in List A, and the patient’s performance is expressed as the 
percent of List A words that are identified correctly. The words in each pair on this 
recognition trial are further distinguished by their level of complexity, with the List A 
words being relatively concrete nouns (i.e. “onion”, “cow”, “desk”) whereas the foils are 
more abstract nouns that are encountered with less frequency in everyday discourse. (i.e. 
“majority”, “technique”,  “sprinkler”). Connor et al. (as cited in Delis, Kramer, Kaplan & 
Ober, 2000) tested this format in a population of traumatically brain-injured patients, as 
well as a population of subjects exhibiting suboptimal effort on the Hiscock forced choice 
test.  The results revealed that this forced choice format had 80 percent sensitivity and 97 
percent specificity in correctly identifying patients attempting to feign memory deficits. 
The CVLT-II normative data indicate that more than 90 percent of the entire normative 
sample scored perfectly on this forced choice subtest (Delis, et al., 2000, p. 162). These 
very high ceiling effects demonstrate the utility of this subtest as a measure of effort, as 
the overwhelming majority of patients, even those with significant cognitive 
impairments, are able to complete this subtest without error. Given this finding and its 
pertinence to the study of malingering and dissimulation, subject performance on the 
forced-choice trial was of primary interest in this study. 
 
1.4. Neuropsychological Assessment in the Forensic Setting 
The aims of neuropsychological assessment within the forensic arena differ with 
respect to the types of patients being evaluated, and are generally concerned with the 
establishing the presence of acquired brain injury and, if such is verified, describing the 
extent and likely permanence of the resulting cognitive impairments. According to 
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Kolpan (1996, p. 102), “the measurement of the claimant’s loss is the disparity between 
the functional abilities before the trauma and his or her disability after sustaining a TBI”. 
Generally, in forensic cases concerning moderate to severe brain injury, where the 
injuries are generally well documented, the neuropsychological exam is focused on the 
determination of the type and severity of the patient’s cognitive deficits and the degree to 
which they are related to the events in question. However, the examination of a patient 
with mild brain injury is often focused on establishing the probable presence or absence 
of acquired brain impairment (Sherer, Madison & Hannay, 2000). In many cases, when 
questions pertaining to the possibility of permanent injury and disability are under 
consideration, the incentive to malinger, or to intentionally perform below one’s true 
cognitive capabilities, can be quite attractive to the litigating patient, considering the 
monetary awards that are often at stake. Therefore, methods to accurately detect such 
manufactured performances are an essential part of the forensic neuropsychological 
evaluation. Complicating this issue; however, is the possibility that a patient’s less-than-
optimal performance is due to factors other than a conscious attempt to appear 
cognitively impaired. These factors can include a variety of psychiatric disorders, such as 
mood, Factitious and Somatoform disorders.  Therefore, all possible explanations for 
seemingly implausible performances must be investigated during the course of the 
forensic neuropsychological evaluation, and making a diagnosis of malingering, or some 
other disorder, requires the clinician to consider the various diagnostic criteria that are 
required in each case. These criteria are discussed below.  
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1.4.1. Diagnostic Criteria for Malingering 
The ability to differentiate intentional from unintentional symptom production 
and symptom exaggeration is of considerable importance, as the personal damage that 
can result from mislabeling a patient as a “malingerer” can be devastating and difficult to 
eradicate from one’s record. Conversely, one would presume that the courts and 
insurance companies would prefer to avoid awarding large sums of monetary damages to 
otherwise unimpaired individuals who have been able to feign permanent cognitive 
impairment in a sufficiently convincing manner.  Therefore, careful consideration of the 
methods used to evaluate and confirm such diagnoses, and of the information these 
methods provide, is of utmost importance.  
The term “malingering” is often used indiscriminately to describe patients whose 
test data do not completely adhere to the patterns of performance expected for their 
presenting problem. Clarification of the term “malingering”, therefore, seems warranted. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; 
1994, pg. 683) defines malingering as the “intentional production of false or grossly 
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives”. This 
definition is unchanged in the DSM-IV Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; 2000, p. 739). 
However, as noted by Suhr et al. (1997, p. 500) “one cannot simply assume that impaired 
test performance in a forensic context is reflective of malingering”. The emphasis on the 
intentional nature of the DSM-IV definition is particularly important, as it separates 
malingering from other sources of symptom production or exaggeration where the 
etiology of the behavior is less well defined, such as Somatization, Conversion or 
Factitious disorders, suggestibility, or mood disorders.   
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The base rates of malingering must also be considered, with the additional 
understanding that the incidence of such behavior appears to vary widely in different 
clinical groups.  Solid data on this subject are lacking, and the available data vary with 
respect to the environment in which they were collected. In survey research conducted by 
Rogers, Sewell and Goldstein (1994), a sample of 320 forensic psychologists in mental 
health settings estimated that approximately 16 percent of forensic and 7 percent of non-
forensic patients attempt to malinger. A literature review conducted by Rogers, Harrell 
and Liff (1993) suggested that up to 50 percent of patients undergoing 
neuropsychological evaluation in the context of litigation might be malingering. 
Although additional research regarding the establishment of base rates of malingering is 
needed, it is also compounded by the methodological problems inherent in identifying a 
subject group that is, by definition, intent on escaping detection. It is also necessary to 
differentiate malingering from other sources of symptom production or exaggeration, as 
noted previously; therefore, familiarity with the different diagnostic criteria for each 
category is required, and these are discussed in the following section.  
 
1.4.2. Differential Diagnosis in the Assessment of Malingering 
As noted above, other phenomena must be considered, investigated and ruled out 
before the label of “malingerer” is applied to a patient. In most cases, alternative 
explanations for unusual test scores and behavior can be found in other DSM-IV 
diagnostic categories, such as the Somatoform, Mood and Factitious disorders (Iverson & 
Binder, 2000). Factitious disorders are closely related to malingering, in that both involve 
the intentional production of symptoms. The difference between these conditions; 
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however, lies in the reward that is sought by the patient. As noted above, malingering 
patients are motivated by external rewards such as money; whereas, the patient with a 
factitious disorder assumes or perpetuates a sick role in order to obtain some internally 
reinforcing reward (i.e. eliciting and gaining attention and caretaking from another 
individual). 
The Somatoform Disorders, according to the DSM-IV (1994, p. 445), comprise 
those disorders that present with symptoms suggestive of physical ailments, but for which 
no underlying disease state can be identified. Each of these diagnoses is distinguished 
from Factitious Disorders and Malingering in that the symptoms are not consciously 
produced by the patient. A significant psychological component is generally identified in 
each of these disorders; however, distinctions can be made between the various 
diagnostic categories. In Somatization Disorder (APA, 1994, p. 446), a constellation of 
symptoms that are manifested before the age of 30 are required for the diagnosis to be 
made, including pain, gastrointestinal problems, sexual problems, and 
pseudoneurological problems. In Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder (APA, 1994, p. 
450), the patient presents one or more physical complaints (most commonly fatigue, 
appetite loss, and gastrointestinal or genitourinary problems) for at least six months. In 
contrast, patients who meet criteria for a diagnosis of Hypochondriasis (APA, 1994, p. 
462) do not present with a specified group of symptoms, but make ongoing complaints of 
medical illness or general physical malfunctioning despite evidence to the contrary. 
Patients diagnosed with Conversion Disorder (APA, 1994, p.452) frequently present with 
pseudoneurological problems, such as loss of sensation or movement, for which no 
underlying neurological problem can be identified. In contrast to the above disorders, 
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Pain Disorder (APA, 1994, p. 458) encompasses an actual physical experience of pain, 
but maintains that psychological factors are central to the onset, severity and continuation 
of the pain. 
   
1.4.3. Assessment of Mood and Emotional Functioning 
Patients with Mood disorders may also generate patterns of test performances that 
raise questions regarding their validity. While hallmark features of Major Depressive 
Disorder (APA, 1994, p. 320) involve significant emotional problems such as sadness 
and hopelessness, additional features are found within the realm of cognitive functioning 
and include: difficulty with information processing, poor attention and concentration, 
reduced decision-making abilities, and impaired memory. Additionally, behavioral 
manifestations of Major Depression can include irritability, poor or inconsistent 
cooperation, and psychomotor slowing. An irrationally negative self-perception is also 
frequently seen in depressed individuals, resulting in abnormal and inaccurate self-
appraisal which, in turn, can lead to a distorted and inaccurate self-report of one’s 
abilities. This constellation of problems can confound attempts to arrive at a valid 
diagnosis for a given patient, as these symptoms overlap considerably with those seen in 
neurologically impaired patients, as well as those attempting to malinger or exaggerate 
their symptoms.   
Cronholm and Ottonsson (1961) explored cognitive functioning in a sample of 
depressed patients and found that these patients demonstrated deficits on objective 
measures of memory. More specifically, their patients scored abnormally on tests of 
immediate and delayed spontaneous recall, suggesting impaired learning; however their 
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performances on measures of recognition memory were generally within normal limits. 
In general, the results suggested problems with spontaneous recall, rather than a deficit in 
the acquisition of target information. Despite these findings, the utility of 
neuropsychological testing in the differentiation between organically and psychiatrically 
based cognitive impairment has been questioned (Smith et al, 1976; Nott & Fleminger, 
1975). In fact, in 1986, Caine stated “we have no sound method for demarcating the 
boundaries between (1) intellectually intact depressed elderly individuals; (2) others who 
have significant affective symptoms and substantial cognitive impairment…and (3) those 
who suffer a progressive neurological disease which manifests itself with both behavioral 
symptoms”. Despite this view, Wells (1979) found that inconsistent patterns of test 
performance were routinely produced by his group of psychiatric patients, in contrast to 
the more consistent test score patterns demonstrated by patients with documented organic 
dysfunction. He interpreted this inconsistency to be indicative of the variable nature of 
depression and its subsequent impact on neuropsychological test performance, and 
considered such test score scatter to be a hallmark of mood disturbance. Additionally, 
depressed persons’ problems with attention tend to interfere with the amount of effort 
expended in any task, including the acquisition and processing of new information 
(Caine, 1986). Accordingly, problems with inefficient acquisition strategies are 
associated with poor recall, as demonstrated by Weingartner et al. (1981). When 
information was presented in a structured format, depressed patients performed similarly 
to controls. However, with successive decreases in the structure with which target 
information was presented, the performances of depressed patients declined on such 
tasks.  
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It has long been understood that patients who sustain significant brain injury often 
develop affective disturbance, associated with the loss of premorbid functioning and 
independence (Lezak, 1995; Fann et al., 1995; Reitan & Wolfson, 1997). However, 
studies examining the impact of emotional state on cognitive functioning in these 
patients, especially memory, have returned equivocal results (Gass, 1996; Alfano et al., 
1993), due in large part to differences in methodology. Despite the lack of a consensus on 
this problem in the brain injured population, relatively more consistent data have been 
found regarding the association between emotional functioning and memory in both 
normals and psychiatric patients. Several authors have found such an association between 
depressive disorders (Zakzanis, Leach & Kaplan, 1998; Kindermann & Brown, 1997), 
schizophrenia (Kareken, Moberg & Gur, 1996) and memory. In contrast, Kizilbash, 
Vanderploeg & Curtiss (2002) demonstrated that depression alone did not exert a 
significant detrimental effect on performance on the CVLT in a group of 399 veterans; 
however, patients with co-morbid depression and anxiety performed significantly worse 
on measures of both immediate and delayed recall, as well as the overall amount of 
information acquired in the course of this test. 
Although these findings are illustrative, any mechanism that might explain such 
an association between psychiatric state and memory has yet to be identified. Some work 
has suggested that emotional problems exert significant adverse effects on tasks requiring 
effortful processing by increasing demands for attention, which is vital to the ability to 
perform optimally on memory tasks (King & Caine, 1996; Zakzanis, Leach & Kaplan, 
1998). An association between emotional state, attention and memory was observed by 
Adams et al. (2001), in that attention acted as a mediator between affective state and 
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memory. These authors interpreted their results to suggest that emotional problems 
prevent the patient from focusing their full attention on the information to be acquired, 
thereby interfering with the patient’s ability to encode such information at expected 
levels.  
Some research has been devoted to examining the degree to which mood 
disturbance can exacerbate, or account for, complaints of neurobehavioral and/or 
cognitive dysfunction. Iverson and Binder (2000) caution that the cognitive problems 
associated with depression, including slowed information processing speed, reduced 
concentration, distractibility, and reduced memory functioning, can interfere with 
performance on both cognitive and symptom validity tests, leading to erroneous 
conclusions regarding the validity of a patient’s performance. They caution that 
depression is “an important differential when considering the possibility of malingering 
or other diagnoses” (pg. 833). In a related study, Trahan, Ross and Trahan (2001) found 
that their sample of depressed subjects endorsed significantly more post-concussional 
symptoms than a group of mild brain injury patients. Despite the observations noted 
above regarding the similarity between acquired cognitive problems and those 
experienced by depressed patients, the depressed sample in this study had no prior 
diagnosis of brain injury or any other medical problems that would better account for 
their cognitive dysfunction, yet this sample endorsed symptoms typically associated with 
post-concussion syndrome and not with clinical depression (i.e. getting lost, slurred 
speech, chest pains).  
The foregoing discussion suggests that interest in the association between mood 
and cognitive functioning has grown, and has begun to expand into more specific areas of 
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study, including the degree to which mood state accounts for performance on symptom 
validity tests. Despite growing interest in the possible association between mood and 
malingering, relatively little research on this topic has been undertaken to date, although 
some studies have revealed interesting findings. For example, Suhr et al. (1997) found 
that suspected malingerers generated higher scores on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck, 19) relative to patients diagnosed with somatoform disorders. McClain & 
Black (2002) found that anxiety, as measured by the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, 
1990) accounted for a significant portion of the variance on all three trials of the Word 
Memory Test (WMT) (Green, 1996). In the same study, performance on the Beck 
Depression Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, 1996) was predictive of 
performance on all three trials of the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 
1996). Contradictory findings; however, have also been published. Rees, Tombaugh & 
Boulay (2001) demonstrated that a sample of inpatients diagnosed with Major Depressive 
Disorder performed in a manner similar to controls on all three trials of the TOMM, 
suggesting that this test is resistant to the effects of major psychiatric illness. The limited 
research conducted regarding the association between mood and performance on 
symptom validity tests, and the equivocal results found in many of these studies, suggests 
that ongoing investigation is warranted in this area.   
Patients who malinger often produce distinct patterns of performance on one or 
more neuropsychological tests, which can vary depending on the nature of the 
examination. For example, patients wishing to appear impaired may exaggerate the loss 
of either cognitive or physical functioning (Larrabee, 1998), or both (Greiffenstein, Goal 
& Baker, 1995; Youngjohn, Burrows & Erdal, 1995).  One method of examining the 
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degree to which patients exaggerate such complaints involves an examination of 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1943) and 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – Second Edition (MMPI-2; Hathaway & 
McKinley, 1989) test profiles, as many of the test items are specific to physical and 
cognitive functioning, and often question the presence of unusual or relatively infrequent 
phenomena within these domains. The MMPI and MMPI-2 are self-report inventories of 
psychological functioning designed to assist the clinician with the diagnosis of a number 
of mental disorders. Built into these inventories are scales designed to assess the veracity 
of the respondent’s answers, based on the likelihood that a given question should be 
answered “true” or “false”, even in a clinical sample  (i.e. responding “false” to the 
question “I do not always tell the truth”). Analysis of test profiles, with particular 
attention to those scales that assess the overall validity of the subject’s responses, has 
become common practice in forensic neuropsychological assessment. According to 
Iverson and Binder (2000), patients attempting to malinger neuropsychological 
impairment do not typically produce invalid MMPI-2 profiles, which are often 
characterized by elevations in the F (Infrequency) scale, which indicate the endorsement 
of highly unlikely symptoms and problems. On the contrary, such patients frequently 
generate valid profiles with significant elevations on specific clinical scales, such as 1 
(Hs or Hypochondriasis), 2 (D or Depression) and 3 (Hy or Hysteria) (Youngjohn, 
Burrows & Erdal, 1995; Larrabee, 1998; Suhr et al., 1997). The Hs or Hypochondriasis 
scale was designed to assess a given subject’s “abnormal, psychoneurotic concern over 
bodily health” (Butcher & Williams, 1992, p. 63).  The D or Depression scale assesses 
depressive symptomatology, and the Hy or Hysteria scale assesses symptoms of 
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conversion disorder, manifested in the development of significant physical disability in 
the absence of identifiable medical disease. Using the MMPI, Heaton et al. (1978) 
reported that subjects instructed to feign head injury symptoms generated test profiles 
with significant elevations on the F scale, as well as scales 1 (Hypochondriasis), 
3(Hysteria), 6 (Paranoia) and 7 (Psychasthenia). Moreover, the observed elevations were 
significantly higher than those generated by patients for whom moderate to severe brain 
injuries had been documented. Similar response patterns have been found using the 
MMPI-2, in which groups of litigating head injured patients and simulating malingerers 
have generated significant elevations on scales 1 (Hypochondriasis), 2 (Depression), 3 
(Hysteria), 7 (Psychasthenia) and 8 (Schizophrenia) (Berry et al., 1995). Hoffman, et al. 
(1999) found elevations on these scales in litigating TBI patients, irrespective of the 
severity of their injuries; but also found that, within the same study, elevations on these 
scales were inversely related to head-injury severity in patients who were not litigating. 
The use of the MMPI to investigate the presence of psychopathology in closed-head 
injury patients has been met with some criticism, due to the notable similarities between 
symptoms of psychiatric and organic disturbances. To that end, some investigators have 
suggested the use of a “neurocorrection factor” to account for scale elevations that occur 
as a function of head-injury sequelae rather than true psychopathology (Alfano, Paniak & 
Finlayson, 1993). Other studies have failed to find support for the use of this factor 
(Dunn and Lees-Haley, 1995), and have suggested that test items that comprise the factor 
may be more sensitive to the effects of depression than brain injury (Brulot, Strauss & 
Spellacy, 1997).   
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Lees-Haley, English and Glenn (1991) noted that litigating patients attempting to 
malinger often generated MMPI-2 test profiles in which they appeared to combine 
simultaneous attempts to both deny and exaggerate symptoms of emotional distress on 
the same test profile. The authors suggested that such patients attempted to portray 
themselves as honest, well-adjusted, high-functioning individuals who were experiencing 
acute trauma and permanent disability. In an attempt to provide a method by which to 
examine such a mixed response set, these authors developed the Fake Bad Scale 
(hereafter referred to as the FBS), which is comprised of 43 responses that purport to 
discriminate such patients from those responding in a more straightforward and honest 
manner. In the 1991 study, this scale was reported to correctly classify up to 93 percent of 
simulated malingerers, and 96 percent of litigants who were suspected of malingering. A 
false positive rate of 10 percent; however, was reported. Other research has demonstrated 
a correlation between the FBS and total correct and response latency measures on the 
Victoria Symptom Validity Test (Slick, et al., 1996). In addition, the FBS has 
demonstrated an ability to detect patients attempting to malinger somatic complaints and 
who also produced cognitive test score patterns suggestive of malingering, as well as 
MMPI-2 elevations on scales 1 and 3 (Larrabee, 1998). Iverson and Binder (2000, p. 852) 
state, “the FBS appears to be a promising MMPI-2 scale for identifying individuals who 
may be exaggerating symptoms”, but caution that “additional research on the sensitivity, 
specificity and predictive power of the scale will facilitate clinical use”.  
Lees-Haley (1997) has also examined the base rates of elevations on the validity 
scales, basic clinical scales and PTSD scales in a group of 492 patients involved in 
personal injury litigation. The PTSD scales (PK and PS) were included in the analyses as 
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they were potentially applicable to the subjects in the sample, all of who had allegedly 
experienced some form of physical or emotional trauma (i.e. brain and/or spinal cord 
injury, burns, musculoskeletal injury, sexual harassment, wrongful termination, etc.). The 
results indicated that, for men and women, the most common MMPI-2 codetype was 1-
3/3-1, which was produced by 41 percent of the sample. For men, the 1-2/2-1 and 2-3/3-2 
codetypes were the second and third most common, respectively. However, this order 
was reversed for the female subjects. These results differ considerably from those of the 
MMPI-2 normative sample, in which scales 1 and 3 were the least frequently elevated for 
men, and were the second and third least elevated, respectively, for women. With respect 
to the validity indicators in the Lees-Haley study, 23 percent of the sample produced an F 
score that exceeded a T score of 70, 19 percent had an F-K index greater than zero, 22 
percent had a K index greater than a T score of 40, 33 percent had an L index below 49, 
and 20 percent had an Fb index that exceeded a T score of 70. For the PTSD scales, the 
mean T score for PS was 63, while the mean PK T score was 61. These results suggest 
that a considerable portion of the Lees-Haley subject sample appeared to exaggerate their 
level of emotional distress, with some subjects demonstrating a tendency to respond 
inconsistently to similar test items. These results indicate that patients involved in 
litigation are more likely to produce MMPI-2 profiles suggestive of significant emotional 
distress and a tendency to make a higher than average number of physical complaints, 
relative even to psychiatric patients and those patients with serious physical injuries. The 
author conceptualizes the type of patient producing such an MMPI-2 profile as “an 
unhappy somatizer involved in a social context which encourages rationalization, 
projection of blame, and complaining”, and suggests that “perhaps litigation provides a 
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form of personal validation” for such patients (p. 754). The etiology of the problems that 
engender this type of MMPI-2 profile are not clear, but this research suggests a 
relationship between the actual event that leads the patient to pursue litigation, the stress 
of the litigation process, the possible payoff associated with a decision in favor of the 
plaintiff, and the degree to which patient complaints are produced by sampling bias. The 
author recommends additional research that incorporates psychometric and social-
cognitive variables, in an effort to more fully illustrate the factors that operate in these 
cases.  
 
1.5. Assessment Methods for the Detection of Malingering 
The evaluation of suspected malingering has been accomplished by different 
means, with some clinicians advocating the analysis of test score patterns and 
inconsistencies in behavior and self-report (Williams, 2002; Martens, Donders & Millis, 
2001; Slick, Iverson & Green, 2000; Slick et al., 1994; Suhr et al., 1997), or the use of 
specific measures of response bias (Rose, Hall & Szalda-Petree, 1995; Rose, Hall & 
Szalda-Petree, 1998; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989; Binder & Pankratz, 1987), or both 
(Trueblood and Schmidt, 1993). The following sections discuss these approaches in 
detail.  
 
 1.5.1. Symptom Validity Testing 
The concept that subjective reports of cognitive problems may persist in some 
patients, often inexplicably, after mild head injury is not of recent origin. Miller first used 
the term “compensation neurosis” in 1961 to suggest that some litigating patients 
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presenting with persisting cognitive complaints were prone to conscious and/or 
unconscious exaggeration of their symptoms, and were not manifesting the residua of 
true organic impairment. This opinion was not universally shared at that time; with a 
subsequent survey of neurosurgeons (Auerbach, et al., 1967) suggesting that opinion was 
almost evenly divided between an organic versus an emotional etiology for the 
persistence of such symptoms. Only a small proportion of this sample of physicians (nine 
percent) believed that patients’ persistent cognitive complaints were driven by the 
promise of financial compensation. At that time, systematic methods to more fully 
examine the incidence, and impact, of feigned cognitive impairment were not available. 
However, acknowledgment of this problem encouraged the development of more refined 
methods to detect simulated cognitive impairment, rather than relying solely on clinical 
judgment derived from an examination of patient performance on standard assessment 
instruments. Some investigators (Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993; Iverson & McCracken, 
1990) have noted that the use of traditional neuropsychological tests as measures of 
malingering has been of inconsistent success. Inherent in the construction of such tests is 
the assumption that all subjects to whom the instrument is administered will attempt to 
perform to the best of their ability or, at the very least, will not consciously attempt to 
perform poorly (Slick, et al., 1994). To remedy this problem, the development of tests 
specific to the detection of malingering and suboptimal performance has become a major 
area of interest in Neuropsychology. The ability of such tests to generate a single score 
was seen as a favorable alternative to the use of more sophisticated analyses of score 
patterns on traditional neuropsychological tests, most often of memory (Rose, Hall & 
Szalda-Petree, 1998).  
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An early attempt to construct a measure of effort resulted in the 15-Item Visual 
Memory Test (Rey, 1964). This simple test allows the patient 10 seconds in which to 
view a card on which 15 items are arranged in five separate rows (capital letters A, B, C; 
Arabic numerals 1, 2, 3; lowercase letters a, b, c; a circle, square and triangle; and Roman 
numerals I, II III). Immediately after the 10-second time limit, the card is removed from 
the patient’s view and the patient is asked to draw, on a separate sheet of paper, as many 
of the test items as can be recalled. As with the majority of tests of effort, the underlying 
principle of the 15-Item test is that those patients who desire to appear cognitively 
impaired will perform poorly on this test, even though, theoretically, all but the most 
severely impaired patients are able to recall a “minimum number” of items. This 
“minimum number”; however, has been the matter of much debate. Lee, Loring & Martin 
(1992) found that their population of neurologically compromised patients recalled seven 
or more items, with only seven percent of their sample recalling fewer than nine items. A 
subset of their sample, comprised of patients involved in litigation, recalled fewer than 
seven items and was also significantly less educated than the remainder of the sample. 
Schretlen et al. (1991) administered the 15-Item Test to a sample comprised of 
psychiatric and neurological patients, normals instructed to simulate such disorders, and 
suspected malingerers. The suspected malingerers recalled no more than eight items, 
fewer than any of the other subject groups in this study. Millis and Kler (1995) achieved 
similar results, and proposed a cutoff score of seven items. In an effort to reduce the 
number of false positive classifications found in other studies, Arnett, Hammeke & 
Schwartz (1995) used number of rows recalled, rather than single items, as a means by 
which to evaluate patient performance in subjects instructed to feign cognitive 
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impairment. Two samples were used, the first being a group of college students and the 
second, a group of first year medical students who were felt to provide a more 
sophisticated example of would-be malingerers. These were compared to patients with 
documented intracerebral hemorrhage. Using the cutoff criteria of two correct rows in the 
correct location, they found a sensitivity of 47 percent and specificity of 97 percent in the 
college sample, and a sensitivity of 64 percent and specificity of 96 percent in the 
medical student sample.  Two of the neurological patients were misclassified as 
malingerers; however, the authors proposed that visual acuity and visuospatial problems 
accounted for these patients’ performance and cautioned against the use of the 15-Item 
Test in such populations.  
 Additional limitations are seen in those studies evaluating the effect of 
intelligence on Rey 15-Item performance. Goldberg and Miller (1986) found that, while 
their entire psychiatric patient group recalled at least nine items, approximately 38 
percent of a severely mentally retarded group performed below the cutoff. However, 
unlike many patients who malinger or who have true memory impairment, the errors 
committed by the severely retarded subjects consisted mostly of perseverative responses 
and rotations of the test items.  The results from the Schretlen et al. study (1991) 
demonstrated sizeable correlations between performance on the 15-Item Test and 
measures of intellectual ability. Such findings suggest that the 15-Item Test does not 
possess sufficient sensitivity and specificity for clinical effectiveness in the detection of 
malingering, and Millis and Kler (1995) recommend that it not be used in isolation in 
situations where the detection of malingering is a major thrust of the evaluation. 
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While most tests of symptom validity focus on the examination of feigned 
memory impairment, the Symptom Validity Technique (SVT) (Pankratz, Fausti & Peed, 
1975) was originally developed to test the validity of a patient’s complaint of sensory 
loss. Rather than being a test composed of specific items, presented in a preordained 
order, the SVT is a method of examination that allows the clinician to submit the 
patient’s specific complaint to the rules of chance. The technique requires that the patient 
be presented with 100 forced-choice, two-alternative trials based on the patient’s specific 
complaint (i.e. loss of feeling in a limb, visual problems, memory loss). After each trial, 
the patient is informed of the accuracy of their response. It is theorized that, in response 
to positive feedback, those patients who are attempting to malinger will increase the 
number of incorrect responses they make.  In theory, such an alteration in response bias 
actually demonstrates functional ability within the domain being tested, as the patient 
must accurately perceive the stimulus in order to decide to provide an alternative 
response. Although the patient is told that the test is basic, but very difficult, the laws of 
chance dictate that approximately 50 percent of the patient’s responses should be correct. 
Performances below chance are; therefore, suggestive of a willful attempt to appear 
impaired with respect to the domain being tested. While this approach is attractive, due to 
its simplicity and the freedom provided to the examiner to construct an appropriate task 
on an as-needed basis, clinicians have been cautioned about interpreting the results of 
such procedures, in that specificity is not assured (Larrabee, 1990).   
In 1989, Hiscock and Hiscock developed a different approach to the assessment 
of suboptimal performance that was designed to appear more difficult than the measures 
used at that time. In this format, also a two-alternative, forced-choice test, the patient is 
                                                                 40
       
briefly presented with a written number string, which appears difficult to remember. 
Subsequently, the patient is presented with two written number strings of the same length 
and is asked to identify the target string, which is easily discriminated from the foil by 
recognition of the first or last number. The test is presented to the patient as “very 
difficult”, although its recognition format and the ability to choose between only two 
response alternatives actually make it quite simple, as the subject has a 50 percent chance 
of choosing the correct response each time. In addition, and unlike the symptom validity 
tests that predated it, the Hiscock method allows for the calculation of a chance-level 
score, around which confidence intervals can be calculated. These properties make it 
easier for the clinician to collect quantitative data, and to make more accurate inferences 
regarding the patient’s performance. Those patients who perform at less than chance 
levels are generally suspected of intentionally altering their performance so as to appear 
more impaired, since the ability to choose the incorrect response implies that the patient’s 
memory is sufficiently intact to allow recognition of the correct response, and to opt for 
the alternative, incorrect response.  
 Despite this refinement of the symptom validity testing procedure, the Hiscock 
method appeared to most normal subjects to be much easier than it was described during 
its administration. In an attempt to remedy this situation, and to add to the face validity of 
the measure, Slick et al. (1994) modified the Hiscock test by manipulating the apparent 
difficulty of some of the test items, identifying this version as the Victoria revision of the 
original Hiscock procedure. In addition, the number of test items was decreased, and the 
task was administered on a computer rather than on cards. Their results demonstrated a 
relatively low correct classification rate for subjects instructed to malinger; however, 
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when only the difficult test items were considered, 83 percent of subjects were correctly 
classified. In addition, a more educated group of simulated malingerers was classified 
correctly. The authors reported that the results from their TBI group indicated that the 
Victoria revision was sensitive to real memory impairment; however, their TBI sample 
was also litigating, thus confounding these results.  
Further refinement of the forced-choice method resulted it the development of the 
Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT; Binder and Willis, 1991) which, unlike its 
predecessor, incorporates verbal presentation of stimuli followed by a delay interval of a 
pre-prescribed length, during which the patient is required to count backwards from a 
specified number. After this delay interval, the patient is required to discriminate the 
target number string from a foil. The introduction of the distraction factor in this test is 
believed to increase its specificity as a measure of memory functioning, as amnestic 
patients generally cannot recall previously presented information after a delay or 
distraction, even when the delay or distraction is quite brief (Baker et al., 1993). The 
Baker et al. study also demonstrated that college students who had been instructed to 
simulate memory impairment generated scores below normal limits irrespective of the 
use of the distraction trial. In contrast, amnestic subjects generally performed at the same 
level as normals when the distraction task was removed from the test paradigm. These 
differences in patterns of performance were seen as valuable in aiding in the diagnosis of 
true memory impairment as well as in the detection of deliberately poor performance. 
However, the considerable length of time required to administer the task is inefficient, at 
best, and may negatively impact a patient’s attention and frustration tolerance, especially 
if the task proves to be quite easy (Lezak, 1995). Patient performance on the PDRT has 
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also been found to be susceptible to the effects of abnormal attention and impaired 
immediate recall, thus reducing its sensitivity as a measure of malingering (Binder & 
Willis, 1993). In order to offset the possibility that more sophisticated subjects would be 
able to accurately scrutinize, and thus modify accordingly, their own performance on 
overt measures of malingering, Rose et al. (1995) developed a computerized version of 
the Portland Digit Recognition Test (hereafter referred to as the PDRT-C) that also 
recorded the subject’s response latency. Their results demonstrated that adding 
measurement of response time greatly improved their ability to correctly identify 
simulated malingerers. 
An additional test of malingering, the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; 
Tombaugh, 1996) was based on the use of a recognition paradigm, despite the problems 
noted previously with the use of such a relatively simple test format. The TOMM consists 
of 50 line drawings of common objects that are presented individually to the patient for 
three seconds each. In cases where the patient is suspected of being inattentive, the test 
manual (pg. 17) instructs the examiner to point to each picture as it is presented. The 
patient is instructed to look at each picture and attempt to remember it. After presentation 
of the pictures, the patient is presented with the 50 target pictures; each one paired with a 
foil, and is asked to identify the target. For each selection, the patient is informed whether 
their choice is correct or incorrect and, for incorrect responses, the examiner points to the 
correct picture. This procedure is repeated on a second learning trial, which is 
administered immediately after Trial 1 and in which the target pictures are paired with a 
different set of foils than those found in Trial 1. An optional Retention Trial can be 
administered 15 minutes after the completion of Trial 2, in which the patient is presented 
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with the 50 target pictures, paired with yet a different set of foils, and is instructed to 
select the appropriate target.   
Validity studies (Tombaugh, 1996) suggest that the TOMM is robust to the effects 
of various forms of severe cognitive impairment. Of all the clinical groups, those patients 
diagnosed with dementia generated the lowest scores, with the lowest score being 33 
correct responses on Trial 2 in two patients judged to be moderately to severely 
demented, based on their performance on the Mini-Mental Status Examination. A sample 
of non-litigating brain injured patients generated mean scores of 45, 49 and 50 on each of 
the TOMM trials, respectively. However, a sample of 11 litigating brain injured patients 
generated mean scores of 25 correct on Trial 1, 33 correct on Trial 2 and 35 correct on 
Retention, equal to or below those scores of patients with advanced dementia. Therefore, 
these studies appeared to demonstrate the utility of the TOMM as a useful measure of 
malingering.   
The Word Memory Test (hereafter referred to as the WMT; Green, Allen & 
Astner, 1996) was designed as an ostensible measure of verbal learning and memory, but 
was specifically devised as a measure of response bias, according to the 
recommendations of Nies & Sweet (1994). These guidelines suggest that malingering is 
associated with relatively low scores on tests of verbal learning and recall, recognition 
memory scores that are worse than scores on free recall measures, inconsistent test 
performances, and scores on symptom validity tests that are below established cutoff 
points or are below chance levels. In constructing the WMT, the authors sought to create 
an instrument on which even the most severely brain injured patients would score above 
90 percent correct. Accordingly, a score that is three standard deviations below the mean 
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for such a group is still above a chance level of responding, meaning that scores that fall 
below this three standard deviation cutoff point would be highly unusual and would 
strongly suggest biased responding (Green, Allen & Astner, 1996). The WMT consists of 
20 semantically related word pairs, 10 of which are considered “easy” (i.e. “dog-cat”) and 
10 that are considered more difficult (i.e. “tree-lake”). This list of word pairs is read to 
the patient in two consecutive learning trials. Subsequently, the patient is presented with 
an Immediate Recognition Trial, during which each target word is paired with a 
semantically related foil  (i.e. “dog-rabbit”, “cat-mouse”, “leaf-tree”, “stream-lake”) and 
is asked to denote the target word. Unlike the TOMM, the patient is not informed of their 
errors. A Delayed Recognition trial, presented in the same format as Immediate 
Recognition, but with different foils, is administered 30 minutes after the completion of 
Immediate Recognition. A Consistency Index is also calculated, which tabulates the 
degree to which the patient provided the same correct response on Immediate and 
Delayed Recognition. A computerized version of the WMT is also available. Research 
using the WMT has supported its ability to discriminate between litigating patients with 
mild versus severe brain injuries, with mildly brain injured litigants performing below 
their severely injured counterparts, and often below chance levels (Green, Iverson & 
Allen, 1999). 
The Computerized Assessment of Response Bias (CARB; Allen et al., 1997) was 
designed as a quantitative method of examining response bias, and uses a forced-choice 
digit recognition format. As its name implies, it is computer administered in an effort to 
reduce administration and scoring time on the part of the examiner. The test is presented 
to the patient as a “visual digit memory test”, and consists of three “blocks” of stimuli. 
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The patient is also informed that progression to subsequent blocks is contingent on 
adequate performance, although this is not the case. The supposition in this format is that 
those patients who are attempting to malinger will assume that their performances are 
adequate, and will intentionally perform even more abnormally on subsequent blocks, 
resulting in highly unusual scores.  
The relatively large number of symptom validity tests that have been developed in 
the past several years underscores the emphasis that is being placed on this facet of 
neuropsychological assessment. However, the tests that have resulted from this 
development have also been criticized for a number of shortcomings that are felt to 
undermine their utility as measures of malingering. Inherent in the instructions for many 
of these tests are suggestions that the tasks are quite difficult when, in fact, the tasks are 
designed to be simple enough for even the most cognitively compromised patients to 
perform well. Their relatively simple nature is believed to reduce their face validity, and 
may not convince the more sophisticated or informed subject that the test is simply a 
measure of memory (Slick, et al., 1994). In addition, some tests, such as the Portland 
Digit Recognition Test (PDRT) are quite lengthy, and the addition of several such 
instruments can considerably extend the administration time of the entire test battery 
(Tombaugh, 1996).  
Critics of the forced-choice method of malingering assessment suggest that many 
of these tests are insufficiently sensitive, and therefore, result in a high number of false 
negative classifications.  Many symptom validity tests require that the patient generate a 
worse-than-chance performance in order to be classified as malingering, relying on the 
binomial theorem for the derivation of cutoff scores. This relatively simple test format 
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does not require that normative samples be collected for these tests, as simple cutoff 
scores could be calculated based on the number of responses that constituted a chance 
level of effort (Williams, 1998). However, it has been demonstrated that the simplistic 
nature of these tests resulted in lowered sensitivity (Binder, 1993). Iverson and Binder 
(2000, p. 841) caution, “Any FCT (forced-choice test) that relies on binomial significance 
and that lacks empirical derivation of a cutoff score is inadequately sensitive for routine 
clinical use”. In order to correct for the potential classification problems raised by the use 
of binomially derived cutoff scores, some of the newer symptom validity measures have 
cutoff scores that are empirically derived, in an effort to increase sensitivity and enhance 
their clinical utility. In addition, the methods used to validate many of the symptom 
validity tests have been questioned. As with many other psychological and 
neuropsychological measures, validation of symptom validity measures on the specific 
population targeted for assessment is highly recommended (Coleman, et al., 1998). 
Despite these advances, such problems continue to raise questions about the utility of 
many of the malingering measures currently in use. 
 
1.5.2. Unusual Response Styles 
Tombaugh (1996, p. 4) notes “consensus exists among neuropsychologists, 
forensic psychologists, and psychiatrists that inconsistency is the hallmark of 
malingering”. Iverson and Binder (2000); therefore, suggest that the clinician be 
cognizant of any inconsistencies that occur during the evaluation, both in test 
performance as well as in the patient’s behavior. Often, these take the form of a patient 
who is able to provide a detailed history of their accident or illness, subsequent 
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treatments and course of recovery, but whose memory test performance is significantly 
impaired. Other inconsistencies cited by the authors include patients who complain of 
problems with receptive/expressive language and perform poorly on formal tests of such 
functions, but who are able to carry on conversation with no apparent limitations. 
Inconsistencies in motor performances may also be seen, such as patients who complain 
of loss of upper extremity function but are able to write, draw and gesture without 
apparent problems. Patients may also perform inconsistently on different tests of the 
same cognitive construct. Finally, the authors suggest that clinicians examine 
inconsistencies across serial evaluations, with special attention to scores on the same tests 
that decline from one evaluation to the next. Such findings would be inconsistent with the 
expected recovery from brain injury over time, as well as the effects of practice.  
Greiffenstein et al. (1994, 1995) provide guidelines for the empirical examination 
of performance inconsistencies, and suggest that subject samples be divided not on the 
basis of their litigation status, but on the basis of other criteria that are typically part of 
the clinical evaluation. In particular, the incidence of such factors such as poor 
performance on at least two neuropsychological tests, total disability in one of the 
patient’s major social roles, lack of agreement between the patient’s reported problems 
and collateral information, and loss of long-term memory often suggest an attempt on the 
patient’s part to feign cognitive impairment and a level of disability deserving of 
financial compensation. In their samples, patients who met at least two of these criteria 
generated more abnormal scores on memory tests than those patients with persistent 
memory complaints who did not have any of the problems noted above. Interestingly, the 
suspected malingering group’s overall performance on memory tests was comparable to 
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that obtained by patients with more severe brain injuries, thereby providing a more 
refined and specific classification than is provided in other studies using a similar format.  
Patients who consciously attempt to produce impaired performances on 
neuropsychological tests may use different methods to achieve their goal. According to 
Williams (1998), a patient’s performance on features that are common to many standard 
memory tests, such as immediate recall (i.e. Digit Span) and recognition trials, can be 
analyzed to detect patterns of performance that are illogical and; therefore, suggestive of 
malingering. Accordingly, malingerers may employ different response styles in an effort 
to appear impaired with respect to memory. For example, patients may choose to respond 
incorrectly, based on their ability to estimate the number of incorrect responses that can 
be given without creating the impression that their poor performance is intentional. The 
ability to do so depends on the complexity of the test in question, with those tests that are 
composed of a specific number of trials that can be counted or anticipated being the 
easiest on which to malinger. Patients may also feign problems with attention and 
concentration, or may respond very slowly, thus affecting their scores on timed tasks and 
producing the illusion of cognitive dysfunction. As noted previously; however, response 
latency has been shown to discriminate the performances of malingerers and controls on 
the Portland Digit Recognition Test (Rose, et al., 1995); therefore, observation of such 
behavior may suggest that the patient is performing below their capability. Malingering 
patients may also respond in an indiscriminant manner, especially on tasks that allow the 
subject to choose an answer from a set of possible responses (i.e. recognition tests). 
Finally, some patients may respond in an incorrect, but systematic fashion, such as 
providing an intentionally incorrect response on every third trial. Consideration of such 
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response styles is; therefore, recommended when considering the validity of the patient’s 
performance. 
 
1.5.3. Pattern Analysis 
Suhr and Gunstad (2000) advocate the use of an analysis of score patterns on 
traditional neuropsychological measures for the detection of malingering, based on 
several points. They point to the often-transparent nature of many malingering measures, 
which allows the relatively sophisticated malingerer to adjust their performance 
accordingly to avoid detection. In addition, they note that the addition of multiple 
symptom validity measures can add considerable administration time to an already 
lengthy test battery. For these reasons, they suggest that more traditional tests of 
cognitive functioning be used as measures of malingering; however, they caution against 
the use of cutoff scores that are often derived from these measures, citing previous 
findings that such cutoff scores do not reliably discriminate malingerers from those 
patients with true organic impairment.   
Iverson and Binder (2000) also advocate the use of pattern analysis, and describe 
a systematic method for analyzing such patterns on standard neuropsychological tests, 
using information gathered from the considerable body of research that has been 
conducted with regard to the establishment of cutoff scores for acceptable performances 
on such tests. The authors’ approach involves four steps, each considering the base rates 
for specific test performances in different populations, including normal subjects, non-
litigating brain injured patients, patients with severe brain injuries, and known or 
suspected malingerers. Larrabee (2000) reminds clinicians of the need to remember that 
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symptom validity must be established for all patients seen in the course of forensic 
evaluation, as it cannot be assumed that patients who have actually sustained injuries will 
not attempt to exploit them for the promise of increased external rewards, particularly 
money. He goes on to note that, for many mild brain injury patients involved in litigation, 
patterns of performance on neuropsychological tests are often illogical, and do not fit 
with those patterns that have been established in the literature.  
Patterns of performance on list learning tasks such as the Rey Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test (RAVLT) and the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT) have also been 
examined for evidence of malingering. Results have generally demonstrated that patients 
suspected of malingering are more likely to generate scores on the recognition trial that 
are significantly below those generated on the free recall trials (Bernard, 1996; Millis et 
al., 1995; Bollich et al., 2002). In addition, malingering subjects were found to recall 
fewer words from the first third of the RAVLT list than controls, generating a serial 
position effect that was believed to discriminate malingering from non-malingering 
subjects (Bernard, 1996). In another study using the RAVLT, Suhr et al. (1997) found 
that their group of suspected malingerers performed similarly to other groups with respect 
to learning on trials one through five; however, their total number of words acquired was 
significantly below that of head injured, litigating patients, depressed patients, and 
patients diagnosed with somatoform disorders. In addition, the suspected malingerers 
performed below these same groups on RAVLT delayed recall trial and on numbers of 
recognition true positive and true negative responses. Finally, the suspected malingerers 
were more likely than these same groups to fail to recognize a word that had previously 
been recalled at least three times on the five learning trials.  
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In an effort to investigate the utility of previously established cutoff scores 
designating valid performance on the CVLT, Slick, Iverson and Green (2000) examined 
193 patients seeking compensation for alleged brain injuries. By using cutoff scores for 
four of the CVLT indexes (Total Trials 1-5, Long Delay Cued Recall, Recognition Hits 
and Recognition Discriminability), they constructed a Summary Index which was 
assigned a positive value if a suboptimal score was found on any one of the four subtests 
from which it was comprised. The Summary Indexes were compared between the two 
groups. The results indicated that outcome was unrelated to the age of the patient and the 
severity of the brain injury. However, in contrast to their hypotheses, moderately to 
severely impaired patients in their sample performed worse than less severely impaired 
patients on the CVLT, resulting in a higher than average false positive rate for the 
classification of suboptimal performance using this composite index. The authors suggest 
that the CVLT is sensitive to true memory impairment, consistent with its intended use as 
a neuropsychological measure, and recommend the use of more conservative cutoff 
criteria (Recognition Hits and Discriminability) when using this test in the assessment of 
malingering. Connor, et al. (1997) examined the utility of the forced-choice recognition 
task on the CVLT. Using a cutoff of less than 87 percent correct, they were able to 
correctly classify simulated malingerers with 80 percent sensitivity and 97 percent 
specificity, and suggested that this test was as useful in the detection of insufficient effort 
as other forced-choice format tests, but could be administered in less time, making it a 
more efficient assessment method. With respect to the CVLT-II, the test manual notes 
that more than 90 percent of the normative sample achieved a perfect performance on the 
                                                                 52
       
forced-choice recognition trial, theoretically making this test ideal for the detection of 
insufficient effort. However, research on the true utility of this test has yet to be reported.  
Previous research using the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (hereafter referred 
to as the WMS-R) in the assessment of malingering has been relatively sparse. 
Mittenberg et al., (1993) demonstrated a difference between the General Memory and 
Attention/Concentration Indexes that correctly classified 83 percent of their sample of 
simulated malingerers. In 1996, Iverson and Franzen employed a two-alternative forced-
choice recognition trial for the Logical Memory I subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale 
– Revised. Using a cutoff score of less than 18 (out of 24) correct forced choice 
responses, a correct classification rate of 93 percent was achieved for their group of 
experimental malingerers, and a 97 percent overall correct classification rate when all 
groups were considered.  
Even fewer studies exist that examine the utility of the WMS-III in the detection 
of malingering. This is surprising, given that some of the subtests of the WMS-III (i.e. 
Logical Memory, Word Lists, Verbal Paired Associates, Visual Reproduction and Faces) 
have been expanded to include two-alternative, forced-choice recognition trials, 
ostensibly making them ideal candidates for the examination of malingering on this test. 
Killgore and DellaPietra (2000a) examined the wording and ordering of questions on the 
recognition trial of the Logical Memory subtest, hypothesizing that the wording of some 
of the questions would bias respondents toward a “yes” or “no” response set, while other 
questions primed respondents toward a “yes” response on the next question in the subtest. 
These hypotheses were confirmed in their study, in which the Logical Memory 
recognition subtest was administered to a group of 31 normal subjects and 36 
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neurologically impaired patients who had never heard the two Logical Memory stories. 
The results identified a subset of six items on the recognition subtest that were rarely 
answered incorrectly, even by naïve subjects. This subset of items was termed the Rarely 
Missed Index (hereafter referred to as the RMI). In a follow-up study, Killgore and 
DellaPietra (2000b) examined the same effect in a group of 36 simulated malingerers and 
in data collected retrospectively from a group of 51 non-litigating patients with a variety 
of neurological problems. Their results indicated that the RMI achieved a sensitivity of 
97 percent and a specificity of 100 percent in the sample used in this study, comparable 
to the efficacy of many of the more recognized malingering tests currently available. The 
RMI was also endorsed for its efficiency as a test of malingering, since the Logical 
Memory recognition subtest is an inherent part of the WMS-III battery and; therefore, the 
ability to calculate the RMI is not dependent on the administration of an additional test. 
 
1.5.4: Comprehensive Methods 
While the above discussion presents evidence to support individual methods of 
malingering detection, by the use of specific tests, analysis of behavioral styles, or 
recognition of specific patterns of performance on cognitive tests, no one method has 
emerged as the “gold standard” of malingering detection. Nies and Sweet (1994) 
proposed a multidimensional approach to malingering detection which combined the 
results of specific malingering tests, results of standard neuropsychological measures 
administered in forced-choice formats, consideration of both intra- and inter-subtest 
scatter and illogical patterns of test performance, and inconsistencies between test 
performance, patient self-report and collateral data. While this method provided 
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suggestions for a better-rounded conceptualization of cases in which malingering was 
suspected, it lacked a systematic method by which to apply these concepts. Slick, 
Sherman and Iverson (1999) refined this approach, providing a definition of malingering 
of cognitive dysfunction in the context of forensic neuropsychological assessment, and 
organizing a set of diagnostic criteria into the form of a comprehensive and logical 
decision-making strategy for the detection of malingering of neurocognitive deficits in 
such cases. Central to these diagnostic criteria is the concept that diagnostic certainty in 
the detection of malingering is not possible; therefore, these criteria provide methods of 
information analysis that provide levels of diagnostic certainty, rather than forcing the 
clinician to classify a given patient in a dichotomous, “all-or-nothing” manner. 
Accordingly, classifications of the likelihood of Malingering Neurocognitive Dysfunction 
(hereafter abbreviated “MND”) can be made, including designations of Definite, 
Probable and Possible MND.  Criteria to be considered include 1) the presence of a 
substantial external incentive, which is required for any level of diagnosis to be made; 2) 
evidence from neuropsychological testing, including, but not limited to, discrepancies 
between known patterns of brain functioning, various patient behaviors, information from 
collateral reports, and the test data; 3) evidence from the patient’s self-report, including 
discrepancies with the documented history, behavior, collateral information and evidence 
of exaggerated or feigned psychological problems; and 4) that the behaviors meeting the 
necessary criteria from points 1 and 3 are not better accounted for by other (psychiatric, 
neurological or developmental) factors. While this method of decision-making and 
diagnosis was intended to provide a framework to inform the clinician’s 
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conceptualization of an individual patient, the authors warn that the proposed criteria 
cannot be applied rigidly to every case, and that clinical judgment is also necessary.   
 
1.6. The Effects of Coaching on Neuropsychological Test Performance 
When patients present for neuropsychological assessment, it is reasonable to 
expect that, while they may have been previously exposed to some or all of the tests used 
in such an assessment, they are unaware of the intent and/or the structure of these specific 
tests. However, within the area of forensic assessment in Neuropsychology, there is 
growing evidence that some patients arrive for testing with intimate knowledge of the test 
instruments, ostensibly provided by their legal counsel. Of course, such practices pose 
serious threats to the integrity of such evaluations, certainly compromise the validity of 
the test results, and expose proprietary and copyright-protected information to the general 
public. 
The absolute degree to which attorneys provide information to their clients is 
unknown; however, prior survey research (Wetter & Corrigan, 1995) indicated that 65 
percent of both law students and attorneys reported that they believed that they should 
inform their clients of the purposes of psychological testing. In addition, 36 percent of the 
law students and 48 percent of attorneys in this study stated that they felt that they should 
always or usually inform their clients that tests of effort and symptom validity may be 
administered in the course of a neuropsychological evaluation. These data are 
concerning, particularly since they were collected almost 10 years ago and may not 
accurately reflect the increase in sophistication that has presumably occurred with respect 
to attorneys’ knowledge of such issues, and their attempts to coach their clients 
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accordingly. It has also been demonstrated that the provision of education and 
information regarding the cognitive sequelae of brain injury allows subjects instructed to 
feign cognitive deficits to produce test scores that are similar to patients with acquired 
injuries (Frederick et al., 1994). 
 More recently, Essig et al. (2001) conducted survey research to examine the 
current practices of forensic neuropsychologists and attorneys. Their results indicated that 
approximately 75 percent of the attorneys sampled actively prepare their clients prior to 
the assessment. In these cases, “preparation” often included dissemination of specific test 
content. Approximately eight percent of the attorneys responding to the survey admitted 
that they instruct their clients on how to respond to specific questions on cognitive 
measures. In addition, the results indicated that a large proportion of the responding 
attorneys reviewed specific malingering tests with their clients, as well as the validity 
indicators on more traditional tests. For example, approximately 29 percent of the 
attorneys surveyed reviewed the MMPI-2 with their clients. In addition, the authors note 
that, even if the attorney does not review a specific malingering test with the client, the 
information provided may allow the client to recognize typical symptom validity test 
formats and to adjust their test performance accordingly.  These findings suggest that the 
practice of client coaching by attorneys should be recognized as a growing concern in the 
field of forensic neuropsychological assessment.  
 In addition to the continued threat of attorney coaching, concerns are also being 
raised regarding the availability of information about neuropsychological testing in the 
popular media, and on the Internet. A recent article in the Boston Globe (Barry, 2002) 
reviewed a recently published article pertaining to the use of diagnostic and symptom 
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validity testing, and the availability of such information on the Internet. Ironically, the 
publication of such an article in the popular press would appear to only exacerbate 
problems with test security, as interested newspaper readers would be alerted to the ready 
availability of such information. The study in question, by Ruiz, et al. (2002), undertook 
an extensive search of Internet websites; using standard search engines, and revealed a 
multitude of sites devoted to the dissemination of information relevant to 
neuropsychological assessment. The majority of these sites (70 to 85 percent) were 
considered to be of only minimal threat in terms of their ability to provide information 
that would allow someone to successfully dissimulate cognitive impairment.  
Approximately 20 to 25 percent of these sites were judged to be indirect threats to test 
security, as they presented enough information to indirectly threaten the validity of 
certain psychological tests. Two to five percent of the sites; however, were considered 
direct threats in that they presented detailed information about specific tests, including 
test questions and examples of test stimuli (i.e. the stimuli from the Mattis Dementia 
Rating Scale as well as the Rorschach inkblots). One “popular Internet auction site” 
(Ruiz, et al., 2002, p. 296) listed a set of Rorschach cards for sale. Still other sites were 
found to present detailed information regarding the methods used to detect malingering 
and dissimulation on several tests, including a discussion of the validity scales of the 
MMPI-2. Still other sites were found that provided detailed information regarding the 
purpose of medicolegal evaluations, with suggestions on how to conduct oneself in a 
convincing manner so as to obtain disability benefits. These results are disturbing, at best, 
particularly in that the authors noted that the majority of the developers of the sites 
deemed to be direct threats identified themselves as lawyers or, even more concerning, as 
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psychologists. Even before this study was published, such threats to the integrity and 
usefulness of tests of malingering had been reported. In 1989, Coleman et al. suggested 
that, given the increasing sophistication of legal professionals who are concerned with 
their clients’ performance on neuropsychological examinations, and who coach their 
clients accordingly, the usefulness of many of the symptom validity measures in current 
use may be time limited and that more, and more sophisticated measures, are in need of 
development. 
In order to more fully explore this topic, a multitude of studies have been 
undertaken to examine the effects of coaching on subject performance on both tests of 
malingering and on traditional measures of cognitive functioning. Since a sample of 
confirmed malingerers is generally difficult to come by, many studies have utilized 
subjects instructed to simulate the perceived effects of acquired brain injury. However, 
Suhr et al. (1997) note that studies that rely on simulation of malingering may not be 
generalizable to those situations that the practicing neuropsychologist encounters in the 
normal course of their clinical work, highlighting their limited utility as a source of 
information regarding the detection of malingering. Despite these limitations, a review of 
the pertinent literature on the effects of coaching is presented below. 
Coleman and colleagues (1998) examined the effect of coaching on performance 
on the CVLT. Their sample of 90 undergraduate students was divided into three groups, 
consisting of subjects instructed to malinger, subjects instructed to malinger and also 
provided with information regarding the cognitive sequelae of mild head injury, and 
controls. While their results indicated that the use of some CVLT indices, such as Total 
Learning and Delayed Recall, is useful in detecting patients who may be malingering, 
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those subjects who are coached are often able to modify their responses such that their 
scores on these measures are within normal limits. However, their work suggested that 
more subtle indices, such as Discriminability, Recognition Hits and learning slope, are 
relatively robust to the effects of coaching. Their findings are consistent with, although 
somewhat less definitive than, the findings in previous work by Millis et al. (1995); 
which indicated that Recognition Hits provided the most predictive power in their 
attempts to correctly classify naïve and coached malingerers. They recommend that 
special attention be given to a patient’s Recognition Hits score in cases where 
malingering is suspected.  
 As noted previously, Suhr and Gunstad (2000) have recommended that clinicians 
forego the use of specific tests of malingering in favor of the analysis of score patterns on 
traditional neuropsychological tests due, in part, to the obvious nature of many of the 
malingering tests. They examined the performances of naïve, coached, and subjects who 
were coached but also warned about the likelihood that their deceptive test taking 
strategies would be discovered, on the RAVLT. The authors hypothesized that coached 
malingerers would perform poorly on all tests, that coached but warned malingerers 
would score within normal limits on forced-choice malingering measures (i.e. the PDRT), 
but would generate impaired scores on the RAVLT, and normal controls would perform 
well on all tests. Their results demonstrated that, despite warnings, the coached and 
warned subjects generated suspicious patterns of performance on Learning versus 
Recognition scores on the RAVLT that revealed their intent to malinger. However, this 
group was able to alter their collective performance on the PDRT such that the sensitivity 
of this measure as a test of malingering was reduced. The authors concluded that reliance 
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on a pattern analysis method appears to be robust to the effects of both coaching and 
warnings to subjects about the possible use of methods to detect feigned memory 
impairment.  
Sullivan, Keane & Deffenti (2000) offered incentives to two groups of subjects 
instructed to malinger memory deficits on the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test 
(RAVLT), with one group warned that procedures to detect insufficient performance 
would be used. They hypothesized that the group receiving the warning would perform 
better than the no-warning group; however, their analysis revealed no differences in 
overall performance between these two groups, but also revealed that both groups 
performed below a group of controls. Follow-up questioning of the warned subjects 
revealed that, despite the warning, these subjects felt confident that they could generate 
false, yet believable, memory deficits on the RAVLT. The authors concluded that the 
coaching strategies used in this study, which included the promise of an incentive for 
believable but faked memory deficits, were highly effective despite the possibility that 
this false performance might be detected.  
The effect of coaching on the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised has also been 
examined empirically (Johnson & Lesniak-Karpiak, 1993). The results of this study 
indicated that coached subjects scored below normal controls on the Visual Memory, 
General Memory and Delayed Memory indices, whereas those subjects who were 
coached, but warned about the use of detection methods, scored similarly to normal 
controls on these measures. The authors subsequently replicated their findings (Johnson 
& Lesniak-Karpiak, 1997). Bernard (1990) used an incentive strategy to examine 
differences between compensated and uncompensated malingerers and controls on the 
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WMS-R, the Rey Complex Figure, and the RAVLT. The data demonstrated no 
significant differences between the malingering groups; however, both of these groups’ 
scores on these tests were significantly below those of the control group.   
Other studies have examined the effect of coaching and warning on subjects’ 
performance on specific tests of malingering. Rose et al. (1998) found that the 
computerized Portland Digit Recognition Test identified approximately 70 percent of 
simulating malingerers; however, Suhr and Gunstad (2000) found that warning subjects 
about this detection strategy reduced the sensitivity of this test to approximately 53 
percent. Rose et al. (1998) also found that coached malingerers performed significantly 
better than uncoached malingerers on other tests of response bias, namely the Nonverbal 
Forced Choice Test (Frederick & Foster, 1991) and the 21-Item Test (Iverson et al., 
1991). A similar study using a revised version of the Hiscock and Hiscock forced-choice 
memory task found that this test was not sufficiently sensitive to detect the performance 
of coached malingerers who had been warned about the nature of the test (Slick, et al., 
1994).  
These studies raise issues surrounding the use of warnings in the context of 
forensic assessment. Conflicting opinions have been expressed regarding warning 
subjects that their attempts to malinger could be detected, with some expressing the belief 
that providing such warnings, and discussing the possible consequences, provides 
concrete information regarding the intent of the symptom validity portion of the 
evaluation. Those in favor of such a procedure state that such disclosure practices are 
consistent with ethical principles governing informed consent (Johnson & Lesniak-
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Kerpiak, 1997). However, others feel that such warnings only serve to produce more 
sophisticated malingerers (Youngjohn et al., 1999).  
The issues discussed above represent some of the more recent issues in the area of 
malingering detection. Concerns appear to be growing regarding the degree to which 
patients are coached by their attorneys or are more cognizant of malingering detection 
methods and, recently, it has been proposed that tests used to detect malingering may 
become less effective as individuals become more aware of their use and content. Almost 
no research has been done in an effort to examine such concerns; however, recently, 
Greiffenstein and Baker (2002) examined trends in the ability of the Rey 15 Item Test to 
detect malingering, hypothesizing that improvements in subject performance over time 
would suggest increasing sophistication of subjects taking this test. While not finding 
absolute evidence of pervasive coaching on this test, their results did suggest trends in 
improved performance over time in patients with late onset postconcussive symptoms. 
These results were interpreted as suggestive of an increase in the number of subjects who 
were familiar with the intent of the test and its content. Considering these results, it is 
reasonable to suggest that similar research using other traditional malingering tests is 
needed.  
 
1.7. Special Considerations in Malingering Research 
 According to Cercy, Schretlen and Brandt (1997, p. 89), “no ‘gold standard’ 
exists to determine with certainty whether a patient is feigning symptoms independent of 
the clinical tests or experimental procedures being investigated”. Attempts to investigate 
malingering have been hampered by methodological problems, and the various methods 
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commonly used in malingering research continue to be the topic of significant and 
ongoing debate. For example, simulation research has been employed frequently in the 
investigation of malingering. These research paradigms are closely related to traditional 
experimental methods, wherein subjects are assigned to experimental and control groups. 
Generally, the experimental group receives some instruction to malinger, and may also 
receive information on symptoms associated with acquired brain injury. Control groups 
have generally received only basic task instructions and encouragement to perform 
optimally. According to Rogers (1997), the results of these studies are often not 
generalizable, as the groups that are typically included in such research are not culled 
from the clinical settings of interest. In addition, concerns are often raised regarding the 
composition of the groups used in such studies. Typically, such groups are comprised of 
college students, given their availability and frequent desire to earn extra course credit. 
However, Haines and Norris (2001) suggest that the advanced academic status of the 
average college student subject renders them considerably different from the types of 
patients under consideration in malingering research, further reducing the generalizability 
of the obtained data.  
In contrast, the use of the known-groups design in malingering research is 
relatively less common, as it calls for the use of actual patients with diagnosed disorders, 
as well as malingerers. While clinical subjects are generally accessible, the development 
of a criterion group of malingerers is hampered by the obvious difficulty of correct 
identification of such patients. Therefore, while the data collected in a known-groups 
design are generally more clinically relevant and generalizable, due to inclusion of 
known patient groups, a complete discussion of the results generated by the malingering 
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group is limited to only those malingering subjects that were successfully detected 
(Rogers, 1997).  
The above discussion highlights some of the current problems that are frequently 
encountered in malingering research. Rather than continue to advocate one method of 
investigation over another, the use of combined methods in a single research protocol has 
been suggested, in an effort to control for the limitations that are inherent in each 
individual design (Rogers, 1997). Future research using such combined methods may add 
substantively to the body of knowledge that has developed relative to the assessment of 
malingering and deception in neuropsychological assessment. 
 
1.8. Aims of the Current Study 
The preceding review provides an introduction to the nature of memory, its 
assessment, and its role in the problem of malingering detection. It should be apparent 
from this review that questions regarding the veracity of the patient’s cognitive 
complaints, and the validity of their performances on neuropsychological tests, are 
compounded when litigation is introduced as an intervening variable. Specific aspects of 
this complex problem were examined in this study.  
As noted previously, it has been suggested that information about specific 
malingering tests and other methods used to detect feigned memory impairment is 
becoming more readily available to the public via the media, specifically, the Internet. In 
addition, there have been suggestions that an unknown number of attorneys may provide 
their clients with specific information regarding the nature of many neuropsychological 
and psychological tests, including specific test content, and “coach” their clients 
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regarding methods to avoid detection of their feigned impairments. If accurate, one would 
suspect that malingering detection methods might become less sensitive over time as such 
information becomes more widely distributed among attorneys and their clients.  With 
this in mind, an analyses of symptom validity test scores collected over consecutive years 
was undertaken; with an emphasis on the detection of improvement in such test scores 
over time that may be due to knowledge of both test stimuli and purpose. As noted 
previously, to date only one study has examined changes in one symptom validity test 
(the Rey 15 Item Test) over time (Greiffenstein & Baker, 2002), with trends in improved 
performance that were believed to suggest increased sophistication on the part of the 
subjects. Given the retrospective nature of the data available in the Tulane University 
database, it was possible to determine if similar trends existed in the accumulated data 
from this and other symptom validity tests. Specifically, it was hypothesized that if 
litigating patients were indeed becoming more educated regarding specific symptom 
validity tests, scores on these tests should demonstrate decreased variability and a lower 
frequency of abnormal scores, resulting in fewer classifications of invalid performance, 
over time. With respect to the present data, it was hypothesized that such an effect would 
be seen in the data pertaining to the Rey 15 Item Test and the TOMM over the 3 years of 
accumulated data in the Tulane database. Such a trend was not expected in the WMT or 
the Delayed Yes/No Recognition and Forced Choice subtests of the CVLT-2, owing to 
their relatively more recent introduction as measures of malingering.   
As noted previously, memory impairment appears to be the most frequently 
malingered, or at least, the most often exaggerated, symptom of cognitive dysfunction in 
cases where acquired cognitive problems are alleged.  Conflicting opinions, and 
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rationales, abound for the use of analysis of test score patterns on traditional 
neuropsychological tests, versus reliance on more specific tests of malingering as a 
means of examining patient performance, and a considerable body of research is devoted 
to this subject. However, definitive statements regarding the utility of already-established 
tests of memory are lacking, and no studies to date have examined the utility of newer 
memory tests (i.e. WMS-III, CVLT-II) in the discrimination of suspected malingerers 
from those believed to be exerting optimal effort. Such questions are of significance, as 
all of these tests are now widely used in standard neuropsychological practice. Multiple 
hypotheses regarding the utility of newer test instruments can be examined empirically, 
given the wealth of data generated by the inclusion of new subtests and the expansion of 
existing subtests in these latest versions. The literature reviewed previously has suggested 
that recognition memory procedures, in which subjects are instructed to discriminate 
between target and non-target information rather than recall the target information 
spontaneously, are effective methods by which to discriminate malingering patients from 
those attempting to perform optimally, as they are relatively easy to perform and are 
generally robust to the effects of even significant neurological impairment. While such 
patterns of performance have been demonstrated on some traditional neuropsychological 
memory tests, such as the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test and the original version of 
the California Verbal Learning Test, similar research with newer tests using a recognition 
memory format has not yet been done. Given these considerations, for the purposes of the 
current study it was hypothesized that litigating patients would differ significantly from 
non-litigating patients with respect to their scores on measures of recognition memory for 
verbal materials, according to their scores on the Delayed Recognition subtest of the 
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Delayed Yes/No Recognition Subtest of the California Verbal Learning Test-II, and the 
Auditory Delayed Index of the Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition. It was also 
expected that litigating patients would differ significantly from their non-litigating 
counterparts on tests of recognition memory for visual materials, according to their scores 
on the Delayed Recognition portion of the Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition 
Visual Reproduction subtest.  
In addition to the hypothesized differences between litigating and non-litigating 
subjects with regard to recognition memory test performance, it was hypothesized that 
these groups would also differ with respect to their performances on a variety of 
commonly used symptom validity tests, which are often administered in a recognition 
memory format. Specifically, it was predicted that the litigating patients would obtain 
scores below established cutoff points on the TOMM, WMT and Rey 15 Items; therefore 
classifying them as malingering, whereas non-litigating patients would score above these 
cutoff points and would be classified as non-malingering.  
The foregoing literature review indicates that patients presenting for 
neuropsychological assessment in the context of litigation frequently characterize 
themselves as cognitively impaired, with reduced memory being the most frequent 
complaint. It was therefore hypothesized that litigating patients would make subjective 
complaints of memory problems with significantly greater frequency than non-litigating 
patients, according to their responses to such questions on the Neuropsychological 
Symptom Checklist.  
Prior research has also suggested that litigating patients tend to exaggerate 
symptoms of emotional and physical distress. Specifically, litigating patients have been 
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found to generate MMPI and MMPI-2 profiles with significant elevations, within the 
Critical Range, on the F scale as well as scales 1 (Hypochondriasis) and 3 (Hysteria) with 
greater frequency than any other scales on this test. It was hypothesized that the same 
effect would be seen in the current study, with litigating patients generating profiles as 
described here with significantly greater frequency than non-litigating subjects. In 
addition, it was hypothesized that litigating patients would generate scores on the BDI-II 
and BAI that were significantly higher than their non-litigating counterparts, indicating 
that these subjects perceived themselves as more significantly depressed and anxious.  
 
1.9. Method 
 
1.9.1. Subjects 
 
The subject pool was collected retrospectively from the database at Tulane 
University Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry and Neurology, Division of 
Neuropsychology. The available data represented a subset of the pool of sequential adult 
cases referred for outpatient neuropsychological evaluation in the Tulane University 
Neuropsychology Laboratory, with referrals encompassing personal injury cases (from 
defense and plaintiff attorneys as well as Workman’s Compensation), non-forensic 
medical evaluations, psychoeducational evaluations, and other evaluations that do not fall 
into these categories. The available database (using Microsoft Access for Windows ’97) 
consists of test data from approximately 500 subjects seen for neuropsychological 
assessment between 1998 and 2002. These data have been coded according to a system 
developed collaboratively by F. William Black, Ph.D., this author, and the staff 
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psychometrist in the Division of Neuropsychology. In order to ensure patient 
confidentiality, each patient’s data were identified by code number only, consisting of, in 
order, the date of evaluation (two digit year, month, and date) and an additional number 
identifying the examiner (1 = postdoctoral fellow, 2 = intern, 3 = psychometrist).   
 
1.9.2. Measures 
 The specific test instruments included in the TUMC Neuropsychological Battery 
are commercially available measures that are in common use throughout the country. 
Therefore, the available data encompass multiple cognitive, neurobehavioral and 
emotional domains, including intelligence, academic achievement, expressive and 
receptive language, all aspects of memory, attention/concentration, concept formation 
and abstract reasoning, bilateral upper extremity motor functions, emotional functions, as 
well as effort and motivation.  
With respect to memory assessment, the TUMC database includes data from 
evaluations using the Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition (WMS-III), and the 
California Verbal Learning Test – Second Edition (CVLT-II). The CVLT-II, as noted 
previously, is used as a measure of the patient’s ability to acquire, retain, recall and 
recognize verbal information both immediately and after a time delay. The word lists 
used in the CVLT and CVLT-II can be organized into four semantically related lists (i.e. 
vegetables, tools, items of clothing, modes of transportation) that, theoretically, provide a 
structure that facilitates recall of individual list items. The recent (2000) revision of the 
CVLT is distinguished from the original version by the inclusion of several new subtests, 
including the Delayed Recognition subtest examining recognition memory for List A 
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items. In this subtest, the patient is read a list of 32 words, consisting of List A items, List 
B items, and foils, some of which are semantically related to the target words. The test 
requires the patient to respond affirmatively to only the List A words.  The Delayed 
Forced Choice subtest, which is administered at the end of the test, the patient is read a 
list of 16 word pairs, with each pair containing a target word from List A and a foil. The 
patient must identify the word that was presented in List A, and the patient’s performance 
is expressed as the percent of List A words that are identified correctly. The words in 
each pair are further distinguished by their level of complexity, with the List A words 
being relatively concrete nouns (i.e. “onion”, “cow”, “desk”) whereas the foils are more 
abstract nouns that are encountered with less frequency in everyday speech. (i.e. 
“majority”, “technique”, “sprinkler”). Connor et al. (as cited in Delis, Kramer, Kaplan & 
Ober, 2000) tested this format in a population of traumatically brain-injured patients, as 
well as a population of subjects exhibiting suboptimal effort on the Hiscock forced choice 
test.  The results revealed that this forced choice format had 80 percent sensitivity and 97 
percent specificity in correctly identifying patients attempting to feign memory deficits. 
The CVLT-II normative data indicate that more than 90 percent of the entire normative 
sample scored perfectly on this forced choice subtest (Delis, et al., 2000, p. 162). These 
very high ceiling effects demonstrate the utility of this subtest as a measure of effort, as 
the overwhelming majority of patients, even those with significant cognitive 
impairments, are able to complete this subtest without error.  
The WMS-III is a comprehensive battery of tests designed to measure immediate 
and delayed memory in both the verbal and visual domains. Eight index scores are 
calculated from the test data, including the Auditory Recognition Delayed Index (ARD), 
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which provides a measure of the patient’s ability to discriminate target verbal information 
from foils, and represents the combination of two of the verbal subtests found on the 
WMS-III (Logical Memory-II Recognition and Verbal Paired Associates-II Recognition). 
The Recognition portion of the Visual Reproduction-II subtest is used to examine the 
patient’s recognition memory for non-verbal materials, in this case, a set of five 
geometric designs of increasing complexity. These scores (The Auditory Recognition 
Delayed Index; hereafter referred to as ARD, and the Visual Reproduction-II Recognition 
subtest) were of particular interest in this study, as they provided measures of recognition 
memory, and were included in the statistical analyses detailed in the following section.  
In addition to these measures of cognitive functioning, data representing the 
results of comprehensive psychological evaluation for the identified subject pool were 
taken from the database, specifically, the available F, Hs and Hy scale T score from the 
MMPI-2, and the total scores from the Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition 
(BDI-II) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI).  
The Neuropsychological Symptom Checklist (NSC; Schinka, 1983) is also a self-
report measure of current and premorbid problems experienced by the patient. The NCS 
is comprised of 93 items, which can be endorsed by the respondent with a check mark. 
Although the test items are not listed in specified groups, they pertain to possible 
problems within such domains as sensory and motor functioning, pain, seizure and/or 
syncopal activity, disorientation, memory problems, unusual experiences 
(visual/auditory/tactile hallucinations), information processing, attention/concentration, 
judgement, praxis, language, mood, behavior, the presence of other medical problems, 
surgical history, substance use, chemical exposure and family medical history. The 
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checklist was developed as a means of identifying patient complaints with respect to 
physical, cognitive and emotional functioning; however, the author notes that no scoring 
system exists by which to quantify patient responses (personal communication, July 2, 
2002). However, the simple yes/no response format of this inventory allows for 
tabulation of the frequency of item endorsement within the subject sample. For the 
purposes of the current study, the frequencies of subjective complaints of memory 
problems were calculated from subject responses to the NSC.  
The Tulane University test battery also included measures of symptom validity, 
such as the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996), the Word Memory 
Test (WMT; Green et al., 1996), the Rey 15-Item Test and the forced-choice subtest from 
the California Verbal Learning Test – Second Edition (CVLT-II; Delis et al., 2000). The 
format of each of these tests has been described previously in this paper. Subject 
performance on each of these tests is scored with respect to empirically derived cutoff 
scores; with subjects scoring below these cutoff scores diagnosed as probable 
malingerers.  
 
1.9.3. Analysis 
The comprehensive nature of the Tulane Neuropsychology Laboratory database, 
and the flexible nature of the coding system used to store the data, allowed for data to be 
extracted in a number of ways depending on the nature of the specific analysis. In order 
to investigate the hypotheses in which the likelihood of subject malingering was a central 
factor, subjects were divided into groups based on a subjective rating of malingering 
probability. The criteria for such determinations were applied by F. William Black, 
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Ph.D., Director of the Neuropsychology Laboratory at Tulane University, following the 
recommendations of Slick et al. (1999) as noted previously. The specific criteria for the 
determination of malingering probability are presented in detail in Appendix A. Dr. Black 
comprehensively reviewed all subject files in the absence of any information that would 
allow for patient identification.  Following these subjective rating criteria, all subjects 
were assigned one of the following ratings: 1 – Absolute Malingering, 2 – Probable 
Malingering, 3 – Possible Malingering and 4- Not Malingering. Accordingly, four groups 
of patients were available for study, according to this coding system. In addition, data 
corresponding to referral source were also available, and included those subjects referred 
by defense and plaintiff attorneys, Workman’s Compensation, physicians and/or other 
psychologists, by individuals requesting psychoeducational data, and other referrals that 
did not fall into one of these pre-specified categories. This coding system allowed for the 
examination of any effects related to referral source.   
In order to examine the possible change in symptom validity test performance 
through time, archived data were extracted from the available database and coded 
according to year, spanning the years 1998 through 2002. Data collected in the year 2003 
were also available, but did not encompass the entire calendar year. In addition, data 
pertaining to age, sex, level of education, number of previous neuropsychological 
evaluations, and previous involvement in litigation were also extracted for each of the 
cases used for analysis, in order to describe the demographic characteristics of the subject 
samples used in the study. No demographic differences were expected to exist among the 
subject groups. 
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With respect to the composition of the groups used in this study, a potential 
confound existed regarding the neurological status of the subjects within the database. 
More specifically, it might have been be expected that any patients with brain impairment 
would score below their neurologically intact counterparts on specific tests, regardless of 
litigation status, especially on measures of memory, which tend to be sensitive to 
cognitive impairment. Data pertaining to the neurological status of each subject was 
available in the database, thus providing the ability to control for the effects of acquired 
brain impairment in the analyses. Interference from cognitive impairment was not 
expected to interfere with the analyses proposed for three of the malingering measures 
(the TOMM, WMT and CVLT-2 Forced Choice), as the normative data for these tests 
demonstrates that they are robust to the effects of even moderate to severe dementia. 
Previous literature has suggested that the 15 Item Test may demonstrate false positive 
results when used with moderately to severely mentally retarded individuals. As none of 
the subjects in the available database carried such diagnoses (moderate to severe 
dementia or mental retardation), no adverse effects on test performance that could be 
attributable to such diagnostic categories were expected.  
In order to conduct the proposed analyses, adequately sized samples were 
necessary. Accordingly, all available data for the following tests were extracted from the 
database: the Delayed Yes/No Recognition and the Delayed Forced Choice Recognition 
trials of the CVLT-II, the Auditory Recognition Delayed Index from the WMS-III, the 
Delayed Recognition scores from the Wechsler Memory Scale Visual Reproduction 
subtest, the T score for the F, Hs and Hy scales of the MMPI-2, the scores for each of the 
three trials of the TOMM (Trial 1, Trial 2 and Recognition), the scores for each trial of 
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the WMT (Immediate Recognition, Delayed Recognition and Consistency), the total 
number of items correctly recalled for the Rey 15 Item Test, the total scores for the BDI 
and BAI, and the responses to the memory problems question on the NSC. In order to 
conduct statistical analyses of the data enumerated above, it was necessary to export the 
stored data into an appropriate statistical analysis program. Due to incompatibilities 
between the data storage and analysis programs used in the Tulane Neuropsychology 
Laboratory, data could not be transferred directly from the Access ’97 database into SPSS 
11.5, which was used for all data analysis procedures. Therefore, an interim step, in 
which all data to be analyzed were exported from the Access ’97 to Excel ’97, initially 
completed. The data were then transferred from the Excel ’97 file into SPSS Version 
11.5.  
 As noted previously, the composition of the neuropsychological assessment 
battery used in the Tulane University Neuropsychology Laboratory has changed over 
time, as both new and revised tests have become available. In addition, the composition 
of the test battery often differed with respect to the referral source, such that most non-
litigating subjects were not typically administered more than one test of symptom 
validity, if any. This practice has recently changed in the Neuropsychology Laboratory, 
due to growing interest in the phenomenon of malingering or symptom exaggeration in 
non-litigating patients, and to provide increased continuity in the data set. However, for 
the purposes of the present study, insufficient sample sizes were available to examine 
such effects and, therefore, only data from litigating patients were available to test those 
hypotheses regarding symptom validity test performance. In addition, some 
inconsistencies were seen in the numbers of specific cognitive tests administered, again 
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due to changes in the composition of the standard test battery. While such inconsistencies 
may be seen as a weakness in the design of this study, it should be emphasized that the 
evaluations conducted in the Neuropsychology Laboratory are primarily clinical in 
nature, and the composition of the test battery is constructed accordingly. This practice is 
supported by Standard 9.08 (b) of the Ethical Standards of the American Psychological 
Association (APA, 2002), which mandates that “Psychologists do not base such decisions 
or recommendations on tests and measures that are obsolete and not useful for the current 
purpose”, indicating that the most recent version of a given test be used in the absence of 
justifiable reasons to continue to use an earlier version. As an example, given that the 
most recent version of the CVLT provides improved normative data the inclusion of new 
subtests, this test was added to the Neuropsychology Laboratory battery when it became 
commercially available.  To account for the inequalities in sample sizes, individual 
samples were extracted from the database for each of the hypotheses to be tested, and 
include data for the test(s) of interest as well as the demographic data pertaining to that 
particular sample. This method was used to avoid the need to remove subjects who did 
not have data pertaining to each test under consideration in this study, as doing so would 
have significantly reduced the number of data points available for analysis had all data 
been compiled into a single data set.  In order to examine the effectiveness of specific 
symptom validity tests over time, data for the tests of interest outlined in the above 
hypotheses were coded according to year (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003).   
 Analysis of subjective memory complaints in litigating versus non-litigating 
patients consisted of a simple tabulation of the frequency with which such complaints 
were made on the NSC. After tabulating the number of such complaints in each group, a 
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Mann-Whitney U test was calculated to determine if the groups were significantly 
different with respect to subjective memory complaints.  
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2: Results 
Preliminary examination of the data of interest demonstrated notably non-normal 
distributions in all cases. In addition, the study’s use of categorical data required the use 
of nonparametric statistical procedures. Given these considerations, the nonparametric 
equivalent of the one-way analysis of variance test for independent groups, the Kruskal-
Wallis procedure, was used in all cases where a significance test for k independent groups 
was needed. According to Andrews (1954, as cited in Siegel, 1956), the Kruskal-Wallis 
procedure has an efficiency of 3/π = 95.5 percent, making it a relatively powerful 
procedure for nonparametric analysis of variance in the k-group case. As post hoc tests 
are not available for nonparametric analysis of variance, it was necessary to conduct 
multiple Mann-Whitney U tests, the nonparametric equivalent of the t test. Again, 
according to Siegel (1956, p. 116), the Mann-Whitney U test is “one of the most powerful 
of the nonparametric tests” and is “a most useful alternative to the parametric t test, when 
the researcher wishes to avoid the t test’s assumptions, or when the measurement in the 
research is weaker than interval scaling.”  
Given the need for multiple (72) univariate comparisons in the course of the data 
analysis, Bonferroni correction to control for experimentwise Type 1 error was required. 
This correction, for a nominal alpha of .05, yielded a very restrictive critical value of 
.0001.  However, given that this study was, essentially, comprised of a number of smaller 
studies with distinct samples, separate correction factors were calculated for each of these 
respective analyses. This step was undertaken as there were concerns that the overly 
restrictive experimentwise alpha level would obscure any findings of interest within these 
smaller, theoretically discrete analyses. Where indicated, the results of both the restrictive 
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and less restrictive approaches to the data analysis are presented and the results are 
interpreted for each approach.  
 
2.1. General Demographics of the Sample 
Demographic data for the entire subject sample are presented in Table 1. 
Examination of these data reveal that the overall sample was predominantly male 
(64.1%) and that approximately two-thirds of the subjects had previously undergone at 
least one comprehensive neuropsychological assessment. Defense counsel had referred 
the majority of these subjects (50.4%). Although approximately 34 % of the sample 
denied having been involved in previous litigation, this information was lacking for 
approximately 36% of the total sample.   
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Table 1. Demographic Data for the Total Sample 
 
 
 
 
Gender 
N = 1290 
Male 
831 
(64.1%) 
Female 
459 
(35.4%) 
  
Number of 
previous 
neuropsych. 
evaluations  
N = 914* 
No evals. 
354 
(27.3%) 
One eval. 
424 
(32.7%) 
Two evals. 
96 
(7.4%) 
Three or 
more evals. 
25 
(1.9%) 
Previous 
Litigation 
N = 1274 
No 
436 
(33.6%) 
Yes 
142 
(11%) 
DK** 
463 
(35.7%) 
 
Referral Source 
N = 1290 
Defense 
653 
(50.4%) 
Plaintiff 
328 
(25.3%) 
Workman’s  
Comp. 
165 
(12.7%) 
Other^ 
144 
(11%) 
Malingering 
Rating 
N = 979* 
Absolute 
190 
(14.7%) 
Probable 
147 
(11.3%) 
Possible 
149 
(11.5%) 
No 
493 
(38%) 
Year of  
Administration 
N = 1290 
1999 
159 
(12.3%) 
2000 
223 
(17.2 %) 
2001 
376 
(29%) 
2002 
492 
(38%) 
2003 
40 
(3.1%)
* This information has not been systematically collected over time; therefore, some data are missing. 
** DK (don’t know) = data were either not available or not reported. 
^ Includes medical, psychological, psychoeducational, and other evaluations. 
 
 
 
 
Since the overall study was, in effect, comprised of multiple, but essentially 
distinct, studies, separate demographic data were compiled for each of these samples. 
These data are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Demographic Data for Subject Samples by Tests Administered 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Rey 15 
Item 
 
TOMM 
 
WMT 
 
CVLT-2 
Y/N Hits 
 
MMPI-2 
BAI/BDI 
 
WMS-III 
ARD 
 
WMS-III 
VR Rec. 
 
NSC
Education 
(mean yrs.) 
 
12.8  
 
12.8  
 
12.9 
 
12.8 
 
13.4 
 
13.6 
 
12.7 
 
14.9 
 
66.3 
 
65.5 
 
62.7 
 
66.7 
 
58.5 
 
66.3 
 
69.6 
 
62.9 
Gender 
 Male (%) 
 
                      
Female (%) 
 
 33.7 
 
34.5 
 
32.8 
 
33.3 
 
41.5 
 
33.7 
 
30.4 
 
37.1 
Age  
(mean yrs) 
 
39.1  
 
38.6 
 
39.3 
 
39 
 
37.9 
 
40.5 
 
40.5 
 
40.6 
Mos. Post 
Injury 
(mean) 
 
 
31.7 
 
 
38.5 
 
 
38.6 
 
 
36 
 
 
36.4 
 
 
32.3 
 
 
29.5 
 
 
36.3 
Number of 
Previous 
Neuropsy. 
Evals. (%) 
0 
1 
2 
≥ 3 
 
 
 
 
16 
23  
7  
1.2 
 
 
 
 
26.6 
34.8 
7.9 
1.8 
 
 
 
 
31.3 
47.8 
12.7 
2.2 
 
 
 
 
31.7 
50.8 
12.7 
3.2 
 
 
 
 
21.6 
19.5 
3 
.9 
 
 
 
 
44.6 
43.4 
7.2 
3.6 
 
 
 
 
47 
40.9 
7.8 
3.5 
 
 
 
 
49.3 
36.1 
9.3 
2 
Previous 
Litigation 
(%) 
No 
Yes 
DK 
 
 
 
31.7  
9.9  
58.4  
 
 
 
30.7 
9.7 
43.8 
 
 
 
24.6 
10.4 
60.4 
 
 
 
30.2 
15.9 
54 
 
 
 
44.8 
10.7 
.3 
 
 
 
26.5 
13.3 
59 
 
 
 
32.2 
10.4 
56.5 
 
 
 
16.6 
12.7 
70.2 
Referral 
Source (%) 
Defense 
Plaintiff 
WC 
Other 
 
 
54.7 
30 
15.2  
NA 
 
 
53.6 
31.5 
15 
NA 
 
 
60.4 
23.1 
11.9 
NA 
 
 
67.9 
20.6 
17.5 
NA 
 
 
39.6 
25.6 
7.9 
26.8 
 
 
43.4 
15.7 
13.3 
26.7 
 
 
45.2 
14.8 
11.3 
28.7 
 
 
49.3 
16.6 
8.8 
30.7 
Maling. 
Rating (%) 
Absolute 
Probable 
Possible 
No 
 
 
14.4 
11.9  
10.7  
37 
 
 
13.5 
10.9 
10.5 
37.8 
 
 
20.9 
13.4 
14.2 
47.8 
 
 
28.6 
17.5 
19 
34.9 
 
 
4.6 
.7 
6.7 
28.4 
 
 
21.7 
13.3 
18.1 
47 
 
 
20 
13 
13 
53.9 
 
 
12.7 
10.2 
13.7 
63.4 
Year of  
Testing (%) 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
 
 
20.6 
46.9 
32.5 
None 
None 
 
 
21 
24 
30 
52.1 
None 
 
 
None 
None 
47.8 
47.8 
None 
 
 
None 
None 
27 
73 
None 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
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 Examination of these data indicates that significantly more men were evaluated in 
the Neuropsychology Laboratory than women for the years 1999 through part of 2003 (z 
= 14.9, p = .000). It is interesting to note that defense counsel referred the majority of the 
subjects seen for evaluation (50.4%), which is generally seen as a rather contentious and 
unnecessary maneuver by many subjects pursuing personal injury litigation, as most of 
these individuals have, at that point, already undergone a comprehensive 
neuropsychological examination at the behest of their own attorney. Given the nature of 
this clinical situation, in which it may be expected that subjects may be motivated to 
prove their cognitive impairment to the “defense neuropsychologist”, only 14.7 percent 
of the total sample was rated as Absolute on the Malingering Rating Scale.  In addition, 
only 36 percent of the sample received any rating indicative of some degree of 
malingering, less than the proportion of the sample that was rated as not malingering.   
 
2.2: Symptom Validity Test Performance over Time 
2.2.1: Rey 15 Item Test  
 
 
Differences in the number of omission errors over the three years of collected data 
(1999, 2000l, 2001) are displayed in Figure 1.  Inspection of this figure suggests that, 
contrary to the hypothesized effect, more subjects appeared to make greater numbers of 
omission errors over time.  
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 Figure 1. Rey 15 Item Test Scores by Year of Administration 
 
 
 
It was hypothesized that overall performance on the Rey 15 Item test would 
become more normal over time, that is, that the majority of test scores would be within 
the normal range of nine correct responses and, therefore, not indicative of malingering 
or reduced effort. To investigate this hypothesis, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to 
evaluate differences among the three consecutive years of data in consideration (1999, 
2000 and 2001). The test, which was corrected for tied ranks, was not significant, χ2 (2, N 
= 243) = 8.23, p = .01, based on the experimentwise alpha of .001. Accordingly, follow-
up Mann Whitney U tests were not performed.  
As noted previously, significant restrictions were placed on the experimentwise 
alpha level, due to the very large (72) number of pairwise comparisons. As a result, the 
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corrected alpha level was set at a very restrictive level of .001. While any attempt to re-
adjust this alpha level may appear to be an attempt to “fish” for significant results, it must 
be reiterated that each of the hypotheses in this study were based on discrete samples that, 
in effect, serve as individual studies in their own right. With that in mind, it was felt that 
a re-examination of these data as a discrete study was warranted. The results of this re-
analysis revealed a significant Kruskal-Wallis test, with χ2 (df = 2, N = 243) = 8.23, p = 
.016, based on the standard nominal alpha level of .05. A very strong trend toward 
significance was found only between the years 2000 and 2001, with z = -2.35, p = .019, 
based on less restrictive corrected alpha level of .017. Subjects in the year 2000 averaged 
3 omission errors compared to an average of 2 such errors in the year 2001.  These data 
suggest that, as a group, subjects taking this test in 2001 made relatively fewer errors than 
those tested in the previous year, thus providing some support for the proposed 
hypothesis that scores would normalize over time. These data are consistent with those of 
Grieffenstein & Baker (2002), who found a similar trend in their Rey 15 Item test results 
over a 10-year period.  
 
2.2.2: The Test of Memory Malingering  
 
Analyses were conducted on data pertaining to Trials 1 and 2 of the TOMM, 
which are both immediate recognition trials. Data pertaining to Trial 3 (Delayed 
Recognition) was omitted from analysis, as this optional trial was not consistently 
administered in the Neuropsychology Laboratory, resulting in missing data. For each of 
the two immediate recognition trials of the TOMM, Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance 
procedures were conducted to determine the existence of differences between scores on 
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these trials according to the year of administration (1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003). The 
results of the Kruskal-Wallis procedure for the TOMM Trial 1 was not significant, where 
χ2 (df = 3, N = 267) = 6.36, p = .095. Similarly, the results were not significant for the 
TOMM Trial 2 data, where χ 2 (df = 3, N = 267) = 5.41, p = .14.  These results were also 
not significant when a standard nominal alpha level of .05 was applied; therefore, the lack 
of significant findings does not appear to be due to the restrictive nature of the stringent 
experimentwise alpha of .001 employed in this study. Follow-up Mann-Whitney U tests 
could not be conducted, due to the lack of significant findings in the omnibus 
significance tests. The distributions of these data are represented in Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of TOMM Trial 1 Scores for Years 1999 Through 2002 
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Although a significant change in TOMM scores was not found over time for 
either Trial 1 or Trial 2, significant differences were seen when TOMM scores were 
compared across levels of the Malingering Rating Scale (1 = absolute, 2 = probable, 3 = 
possible and 4 = no). The results of a Kruskal-Wallis test to evaluate the relationship of 
TOMM Trial 1 scores among the four levels of Malingering Rating scores was 
significant, where χ2 (df = 3, N = 194) = 82.03, p = .000. Follow-up Mann-Whitney U 
tests were then conducted to evaluate the presence of significant differences between 
levels of the Malingering Rating Scale.  The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Pairwise Comparisons of Malingering Rating Scores for the TOMM Trial 1 
 
Malingering 
Rating  
Scale  
Absolute Probable Possible No 
 
Absolute 
 z = -2.65 
p = .008 
z = -5.71 
p = .000* 
z = -7.89 
p = .000* 
 
Probable 
  z = -3.22 
p = .001* 
z = -5.26 
p = .000* 
 
Possible 
  
 z = -2.53 p = .011 
   * p <  .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to these results, significant differences exist between most of the 
Malingering Rating groups, namely, between Absolute and Possible malingerers, 
Possible malingerers and those falling into the No group, and those in the Probable versus 
the No group. The difference between the Possible and Probable malingerers was just 
within the range of significance, suggesting that some unknown but notable differences 
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may exist between subjects in these two groups, or in the criteria used to make the 
malingering ratings.  
Similar results were found when a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate 
differences between the Malingering Rating scores and subject performance on the 
TOMM Trial 2. The omnibus test was significant, χ2 (df = 3, N = 194) = 94.9, p = .000, 
again despite the restrictive nature of the experimentwise α level of .001. Follow-up 
Mann-Whitney U tests were then conducted to evaluate the presence of significant 
differences between levels of the Malingering Rating Scale.  The results are presented in 
Table 5, and the distributions of these data are presented in Figure 3.  
 
 
Table 4. Pairwise Comparisons of Malingering Rating Scores for the TOMM Trial 2 
 
 
 
Malingering 
Rating  
Scale  
Absolute Probable Possible No 
 
Absolute 
 z = -3.21 
p = .001* 
z = -5.70 
p = .000* 
z = -8.75 
p = .000* 
 
Probable 
  z = -3.10 
p = .002 
z = -6.25 
p = .000* 
 
Possible 
  
 z = -3.48 p = .000* 
* p <  .001 
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These results demonstrate significant differences between all Malingering Rating 
groups on Trial 2 of the TOMM, with the exception of the Probable versus Possible 
malingerers.   
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Figure 3. Distribution of TOMM Trial 2 Scores for Years 1999 through 2000 
 
 
 
2.2.3: Word Memory Test  
 
Data pertaining to the two years (2001 and 2002) in which the WMT was 
administered in the Neuropsychology Laboratory were analyzed with Mann-Whitney U 
tests, to evaluate the hypothesis that the WMT scores would, on the average, become 
more normal over time and, therefore, indicate a lower relative incidence of malingering 
over time. As with the other symptom validity tests evaluated here, the expected 
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normalization in WMT scores over time was hypothesized to be related to subject 
familiarity with the test, or at least its premise, via the provision of such information by 
attorneys or from Internet sites or other sources devoted to the dissemination of such 
information. The results of the Mann-Whitney U tests were not significant for any of the 
three trials of the WMT. Specifically, an analysis of Immediate Recognition scores 
revealed z = -2.06, p = .013. For Delayed Recognition, z = -2.06, p = .039 and for 
Consistency, z = -2.46, p = .014.  
Re-analysis of these results as a discrete study, with a corresponding nominal 
alpha level of .017 indicates that a significant difference exists between years of 
assessment for both the Immediate Recognition and Consistency scores, with subjects in 
the second year of assessment (2002) scoring below those assessed in 2001 on all three 
trials of this test. Overall, Immediate Recognition scores were lower than Delayed 
Recognition scores in both groups; therefore, the significant findings found in the 
Immediate Recognition and Delayed trials are likely related, since discrepant scores on 
the Immediate and Delayed Recognition trials produce low Consistency scores.  Overall, 
these findings suggest a decline in WMT scores over time, in direct contrast to the 
hypothesis that such scores would become less aberrant over time.  
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Figure 4. Distribution of Word Memory Test Immediate Recognition Scores for the 
Years 2001 through 2002 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Word Memory Test Delayed Recognition Scores for the 
Years 2001 through 2002 
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Figure 6. Distribution of Word Memory Test Consistency Scores for the Years 2001     
through 2002 
 
 
 
 
2.2.4: The California Verbal Learning Test-2 Yes/No Hits Subtest 
 
When viewed graphically (Figure 2), a wider variance in test scores is apparent in 
2002 compared to 2001, with a greater number of abnormal test scores seen in 2002, 
contrary to the hypothesized effect of an overall normalization of scores over time. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of CVLT-II Yes/No Hits Scores for the Years 2001 through 
2002 
 
 
 
 This observation is supported by the results of the Mann-Whitney U test, which 
was not significant, z = -1.4, p = .16, irrespective of the use of either the restrictive 
experimentwise alpha level of .0001 or a standard alpha of .05. Therefore, there does not 
appear to be a trend toward normal scores on CVLT-II Yes/No subtest over time.  
 
2.3: Performance on the MMPI-2 Validity and Clinical Scales (F, Hs, D, Hy, Pt), 
Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition, and Beck Anxiety Inventory as a 
Function of Malingering Rating 
 
 A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted on each of the target MMPI-2 scales (F, Hs, 
D, Hy and PT) independently, to assess its relationship, if any, to the Malingering Rating 
Scale. The results of these tests were significant for Hs, χ2 (df=3, N = 153) = 27.44, p = 
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.000 and for Hy, χ2 (df=3, N = 153) = 20.25, p = .000. The Kruskal-Wallis test for scale 
Pt was nearly significant, χ2 (df=3, N = 153) = 14.71, p = .002, but was not significant for 
the D scale, χ2 (df=3, N = 153) = 13.26, p = .004. A Kruskal-Wallis conducted to evaluate 
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II) as a function of 
Malingering Rating was not significant, χ2 (df=3, N = 153) = 13.21, p = .004; however, 
the same test conducted with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) was significant, χ2 (df=3, 
N = 153) = 16.34, p = .001. Follow-up Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to 
determine which pairs of Malingering Rating scores were significantly different for the 
Hs and Hy scales and the BAI, based on Malingering Rating scores. Significant 
differences were found only between the Absolute and No ratings for the Hs, z = -4.83, p 
= .000 and the Hy, z = -4.23, p = .000, scales, and the BAI, z = -3.62, p = .000. 
 
 
2.4: Evaluation of Verbal Memory Test Performance as a Function of Malingering      
Rating 
 
 It was hypothesized that subject performance would vary on these verbal subtests 
depending on the subject’s rating on the Malingering Rating, with subjects rated as 
Malingering generating scores below the accepted cutoff for either, or both, subtests. 
These hypotheses were supported by Kruskal-Wallis tests, which were significant for 
both the WMS-III Auditory Recognition Delayed subtest, where χ2 (df=3, N = 83) = 
24.02, p = .000, and the California Verbal Learning Test – Second Edition (CVLT-II) 
Yes/No Hits subtest, where χ2 (df=3, N = 153) = 28.34, p = .000. Follow-up Mann-
Whitney U tests demonstrated significant differences between Malingering Ratings of 
Absolute and No (WMS-III, z = -4.5, p = .000; CVLT-II, z = -4.44, p = .000). When non-
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litigating subjects were removed from the data analysis, these significant differences were 
not found for either the WMS-III Auditory Recognition Subtest, where χ2 (df = 2, N = 83) 
= .48, p = .79 or the CVLT-II Yes/No Hits subtest, where χ2 (df = 2, N = 83) = .59, p = 
.74, suggesting that malingering ratings did not differ between the three groups of 
litigating subjects (defense-referred, plaintiff-referred, or Workman’s Compensation). 
Considering the WMS-III ARD Index data as a discrete data set, the 
experimentwise alpha was set at .008, less restrictive than the .0001 for the entire study. 
At this less stringent level, significant differences were found on Mann Whitney U tests 
comparing Absolute and Possible Malingerers, where z = -2.86, p = .004. This finding is 
in addition to the significant difference, noted above, found between absolute malingerers 
and those rated as not malingering.  Therefore, this subtest seems to provide some 
incremental information regarding the validity of the responses generated by subjects 
who were believed to be making some attempt to feign memory impairment. 
Similar re-analysis of the CVLT-II Yes/No Hits data, with the same adjusted 
alpha level of .008, revealed significant differences between Absolute and Possible 
malingerers, where z = -2.99, p = .003, and Probable malingerers and those rated as not 
malingering, where z = -3.49, p = .000. Overall, these results suggest that notably 
aberrant scores on these subtests provide additional evidence of feigned verbal memory 
impairment.  The distributions of the WMS-III Auditory Recognition and CVLT-2 
Yes/No Hits are depicted in Figures 8 and 9, respectively. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of WMS-III Auditory Recognition Delayed 
Index Scores by Malingering Ratings 
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Figure 9. Distribution of CVLT-II Yes/No Hits by Malingering Rating 
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2.5: Evaluation of Visual Reproduction Recognition Memory Test Performance as a 
Function of Malingering Rating 
 
 Again, the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate differences in WMS-III 
Visual Reproduction Recognition in relation to Malingering Rating Scale scores, with the 
same expectation as detailed in the previous section pertaining to verbal memory test 
data. The overall result was significant, χ2 (df=3, N = 115) = 16.64, p = .000. Follow up 
Mann-Whitney U tests demonstrated a significant difference between subjects rated 
Absolute and No on the Malingering Rating Scale. However, no significant differences 
were found when non-litigating subjects were removed from the analysis χ2 (df=2, N = 
82) = .22, p = .89.  
 Fewer significant differences were found between malingering groups for this 
data set compared to those found in the verbal memory data described in the previous 
section. Again, the adjusted alpha level of .008 was applied, resulting in a significant 
difference between only the Absolute malingerers and those rated as not malingering, 
where z = -3.69, p = .000.  The distribution of WMS-III Visual Reproduction Recognition 
scores is found in Figure 10 on the following page.  
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Figure 10. Distribution of WMS-III Visual Reproduction Recognition Scores by 
Malingering Rating 
 
 
 
 
2.6: Neuropsychological Symptom Checklist Memory Problems Scores as a 
Function of Malingering Rating 
 
 A Kruskal-Wallis test to determine significant differences between self-report of 
memory problems on the NSC as a function of Malingering Rating was not significant, 
where χ2 (df=3, N = 204) = 1.87, p = .59.Given the non-significant findings, follow-up 
tests were not performed. These results are unchanged when these data are analyzed as a 
discrete set and a nominal alpha level of .05 is applied.  
When displayed graphically, as in Figure 11, it would appear that the rate of 
subjective memory complaints differs dramatically between referral source groups, with a 
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very large number of defense-referred subjects making memory complaints, compared to 
a relatively small number of such complaints made by subjects referred for 
psychoeducational or other, non-medically oriented evaluations.  Despite these apparent 
discrepancies, the omnibus significance test between these groups was non-significant, 
where χ2 (df = 5, N = 205) = 8.4, p = .14, suggesting that the rate of subjective memory 
complaints was similar across all referral groups. The distribution of the NSC Checklist 
responses is found in Figure 11, on the following page.  
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Figure 11. Distribution of Neuropsychological Symptom Checklist  
Memory Problems Scores by Malingering Rating 
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3: Discussion 
 The present study examined the proposed hypothesis that, as a whole, subjects’ 
performances on specific symptom validity tests would demonstrate a trend toward more 
normal scores through time, corresponding to fewer cases in which such test scores 
would be classified as indicative of malingering. Only one study to date has been 
undertaken to examine this proposed effect (Greiffenstein & Baker, 2002), and then only 
with the Rey 15 Item test. The results of that study, although hampered to some degree by 
small sample sizes, demonstrated changes in Rey 15 Item test performance over time, 
with more normal scores obtained in later years; however, these results failed to reach 
significance.  Therefore, while it appears that information pertaining to the “philosophy” 
of symptom validity testing, ways to “beat” the tests, and provision of specific test data 
are available to any person with access to the Internet (Ruiz, et al., 2002), as well as 
suggestions that a majority of attorneys feel obligated to inform their clients about the use 
and content of such tests (Wetter & Corrigan, 1995), empirical investigation of such 
effects have not been undertaken. The reason for this is unclear, but may be related to 
lack of data, due either to insufficient sample sizes (in terms of litigating subjects) or 
inconsistent use of specific tests over time (due to the aforementioned lack of litigating 
subjects and/or changes in test battery composition). The present study was designed to 
take advantage of a large database in a hospital-based clinical practice, in which 
approximately 50 percent of the neuropsychological evaluations conducted are done so in 
the context of civil litigation cases in which permanent cognitive disability is alleged.  
Symptom validity testing, and the detection of malingering, dissimulation or 
exaggeration, was an integral part of the overall clinical approach in this practice, which 
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emphasized the validation of all aspects of the data collected for analysis. Therefore, a 
relatively large body of data pertaining to the evaluation of symptom validity was 
available, as well as to various aspects of functioning (intellectual, cognitive, academic, 
physical and emotional).   
 As noted previously, the structure of this study and the nature of the data used 
allowed for the formation of multiple related, yet independent, hypotheses. Given that the 
investigation of each hypothesis could serve as a unique study, it was felt that a re-
analysis of the data collected to test individual hypotheses was warranted. Doing so 
would lessen the notable restrictions in interpretation imposed by the experimentwise 
alpha level of .0001. While the argument can certainly be made that any re-analysis of the 
data constitutes an attempt to find significance where none exists, the alternative 
argument lies, again, in the overall construction of the study, in which multiple, discrete 
studies were combined to evaluate an important set of theoretically-related topics. As a 
result, the available data were analyzed from both perspectives, and the results of each 
approach are discussed here.  
When conducted as a unitary study, the overall results failed to find support for 
the initial set of proposed hypotheses, specifically that performances on specific symptom 
validity tests (Rey 15 Item, the Test of Memory Malingering, the Word Memory Test, 
and the Forced Choice subtest from the California Verbal Learning Test, Second Edition) 
would demonstrate fewer scores below the established cutoff points suggesting 
malingering through time. Re-analysis of the symptom validity tests administered over 
time revealed a nearly significant difference between omission errors occurring in 2001 
as compared to 2000. These results are consistent with those obtained by Grieffenstein & 
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Baker (2000), who found a similar trend over a 10-year span of time. However, while a 
statistical difference was suggested by the current results, the average numbers of 
omission errors for the years in question were 3 and 2, respectively, well within the 
normal range in both cases. It seems unlikely that a subject, already performing within 
the normal range on this measure, would feel the need to alter their performance further 
to avoid suspicion of malingering. Therefore, it is unlikely that the observed trend 
provides irrefutable evidence that the subjects in this study had been educated about the 
15 Item Test and were making a concerted effort to perform within normal limits.  
With respect to the Word Memory Test, a trend toward worse performance was 
found over time, with subjects’ scores in 2002 falling significantly below the scores 
obtained in 2001 for all three trials of this test. This finding is in direct contrast to the 
proposed hypothesis that such scores would improve over time, had these subjects had 
knowledge of the intent of this test prior to assessment. The reasons for a decline in such 
scores are unknown, and may be related to factors that were not analyzed in this study.  
It was believed that such an effect, had it been supported by the data, may have 
been related to subjects’ growing sophistication with respect to the knowledge and use of 
specific symptom validity tests, or increasing familiarity with the forced-choice formats 
in which such tests are typically administered. The lack of support for the proposed 
hypotheses suggests that the patients in this sample were not influenced or assisted by 
such information. While the majority of subjects studied here may not have been aware 
that information pertaining to symptom validity testing was available to them in the 
popular and electronic media, the findings also suggest that such information may not 
have been provided to them by their attorneys or, if provided, that these subjects were 
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unable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to make use of that information during 
neuropsychological assessment. While the occurrence of attorney coaching has been 
documented, most instances appear to be reported on a case-by-case basis (Youngjohn, 
1995). Survey research of this topic (Essig et al., 2001) has suggested that approximately 
75 percent of attorneys spend some time “preparing” their clients for neuropsychological 
assessment, with the most frequent preparation topic being the content of 
neuropsychological tests. The same survey indicated that approximately eight percent of 
attorneys provide their clients with specific test information, including how to respond to 
neuropsychological tests. Therefore, while these data provide some suggestion that the 
problem of attorney coaching is pervasive, it appears that a relatively small number of 
attorneys actually provide their clients with information that is specific enough to 
appreciably affect performance on individual symptom validity tests. However, given the 
limitations of survey research, the true nature of this problem remains unknown. Clearly, 
this is an area deserving of further study, with larger samples that span a wider range of 
demographic variables and include data from longer periods of time.  
 Additional hypotheses of this study were concerned with subject performance on 
specific subtests of the most recent versions of cognitive (i.e. memory) tests as a function 
of subjective ratings of malingering probability. That is, it was hypothesized that those 
subjects who were rated as malingering, based on the criteria suggested by Slick et al. 
(1999, Appendix A) would perform significantly below subjects who were rated as not 
malingering on these subtests, based on the same malingering rating criteria. Specifically, 
the California Verbal Learning Test, Second Edition (2000) includes a forced choice 
recognition subtest that is designed to function as a symptom validity measure. Similarly, 
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the Wechsler Memory Scale, Third Edition (1997) includes subtests of recognition 
memory for both verbal and visual materials that are, essentially, forced choice 
procedures in that the respondent must respond either “yes” or “no” on tasks requiring 
discrimination of target items from foils. Although the overall test of significance 
supported the stated hypotheses, the difference between those subjects rated as Absolute 
malingerers and those rated as No (not malingering) was the only significant finding in 
all pairwise analyses of the data from both the WMS-II and the CVLT-2. The same 
hypothesis was proposed for subject performance on a recognition test for visual 
materials, the Visual Reproduction Recognition subtest of the WMS-III, which is also 
presented in a forced choice format. This hypothesis was also supported, with follow up 
tests again demonstrating a significant difference between subjects receiving malingering 
ratings of Absolute and No. Based on these results, it appears that the information 
gleaned from these subtests is useful in a comprehensive approach to assessment that 
includes an estimation of malingering probability. Specifically, abnormal scores on these 
tests appear to provide evidence of negative response bias, which is required by the 
criteria for malingering rating proposed by Slick et al. (1999).  
Additional significant differences were found in memory test performances 
among the four categories of malingering probability, when these data are analyzed 
separately and a more lenient alpha level applied. Specifically, significant differences 
were found between subjects rated as Absolute and Possible malingerers on the WMS-III 
ARD, as well as between subjects rated as Absolute and Possible, and Probable and No 
on the CVLT-2 Forced Choice subtest. Therefore, not only do these subtests provide 
information that may distinguish absolute malingering from valid performance, they may 
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also be helpful in situations where the subject's presentation suggests dissimulation, but is 
not overt. Such situations are likely to be more common, as overt malingering is a 
relatively infrequent event.  
The results described above appear, on the surface, to provide strong evidence 
that the tests in question add substantively to the decision-making process in malingering 
detection. However, reference to the criteria used to make such determinations (Slick, 
1999) indicates that the second step in the decision-making process involves the detection 
of negative response bias on the part of the patient, the presence of which is required for a 
determination of absolute malingering to be made. Since the test performances that 
contribute heavily to such judgments, in this case the subjects’ abnormal scores on the 
verbal and visual memory subtests, have already been judged to be symptomatic of 
absolute malingering, it would follow that a correlation between these test scores and the 
absolute malingering ratings would be expected. In essence, this appears to be a problem 
of circular reasoning, in which the malingering criteria and the test performances used to 
make such judgments are significantly related because they are one and the same. This 
does not suggest that such methods are completely unsound; however, examination of the 
malingering rating criteria reveals that evidence of negative response bias is weighted 
heavily in the decision-tree approach advocated by these criteria. The counterpoint to this 
caveat is that negative response bias, which implies a level of performance below chance, 
is relatively rare and, therefore, would only be expected in those patients making a 
concerted effort to perform abnormally.  Therefore, the finding of negative response bias 
may deserve its position in the decision-tree approach used in the Slick (2000) criteria, as 
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evidence of such a bias would be expected to occur almost exclusively in patients who 
are consciously attempting to appear impaired.  
 Additional hypotheses proposed that subject performance on specific measures of 
psychological and emotional functioning (selected validity and Clinical Scales of the 
MMPI-2, the BDI-III and the BAI) would differ significantly as a function of malingering 
rating. Prior research (Lees-Haley, 1997; Youngjohn, Burrows & Erdal, 1995; Larrabee, 
1998; Suhr et al., 1977) has demonstrated that litigating patients demonstrate MMPI-2 
profiles with significant elevations on scales 1 (Hs) and 3 (Hy) at significantly greater 
rates than their non-litigating counterparts. The current hypotheses were supported, and 
are also consistent with the findings from the Lees-Haley study, in that subjects rated as 
absolute by the malingering criteria scored significantly higher on the Hs and Hy scales 
of the MMPI-2 than those subjects rated as not malingering. Significant differences were 
not found on the other MMPI-2 scales of interest (F, D and Pt), suggesting that 
malingering rating was not related to subjects’ tendency to produce invalid MMPI-2 
profiles or to overendorse symptoms of depression or anxiety as measured by this scale. 
However, Absolute malingerers did differ significantly from non-malingering subjects on 
the BAI. The differences in the complexity of test questions may have contributed to this 
difference, as the items on the BAI are simplified and ask the patient to rate their 
subjective experience of specific anxiety symptoms, compared to the longer and more 
complex MMPI-2 test items. Analysis of the BDI demonstrated a trend toward 
significance; but did not reach the required significance level.   
 A final hypothesis proposed that a significant difference would exist between 
malingering and non-malingering patients with respect to self-report of memory 
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problems, as measured by the Neuropsychological Symptoms Checklist. This hypothesis 
was not supported, suggesting that the rate of memory complaints was similar for all 
subjects, regardless of referral question. Overall, the majority of subjects comprising this 
sample, irrespective of referral source or presenting problem, reported memory 
complaints. 
 In summary, the results of the current study failed to find strong and convincing 
support for the hypothesis that symptom validity test scores would demonstrate a trend 
toward normalization through time, ostensibly as a function of increased subject 
knowledge and/or preparation by plaintiff attorneys, although some trends supportive of 
the proposed hypotheses were seen. It was expected that such trends would emerge in the 
data as a direct result of the increased availability of information pertaining to symptom 
validity tests both in the popular media and through coaching by attorneys. While these 
phenomena have been documented, it appears that coaching and outright cheating on 
such tests are relatively low base rate events that would only emerge in studies using very 
large samples. These findings may be related to the relatively low numbers of subjects 
rated as Absolute according to the malingering rating criteria, suggesting that a relatively 
small portion of this sample consciously attempted to appear significantly cognitively 
impaired, and of that small portion, the number of subjects with prior knowledge of the 
specific tests could not be determined. However, it was apparent that at least one subject 
arrived for evaluation with some degree of preparation as, upon completing the TOMM, 
this individual noted that “well, at least I’m not malingering”.  Unfortunately, any other 
subjects who may have been similarly prepared were less forthcoming about their 
knowledge.  
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 Despite the lack of empirical support for the majority of the proposed hypotheses, 
the results of this research are of value clinically. The results underscore the relative 
infrequency of outright malingering, as only a small portion of the overall sample was 
considered to be absolutely feigning cognitive impairment. Such findings should raise 
caution for clinicians, as it cannot be assumed that involvement in litigation automatically 
predisposes a subject to malinger. In addition, the lack of strong support for any 
particular hypothesis in this study also cautions clinicians to avoid assigning excessive 
importance to any one test or assessment method, and to adopt instead the multifaceted, 
information gathering approach that is advocated by the Slick (2000) criteria for the 
determination of malingering. In summary, there does not appear to be one test 
instrument that will provide irrefutable evidence for the presence or absence of 
dissimulation or outright malingering.  
 The need for continued research in the area of symptom validity testing is 
apparent. This study did not evaluate the relationship between test performance 
(symptom validity or memory tests) and various demographic variables, such as 
education, previous litigation, number of previous neuropsychological evaluations, or 
gender. In addition, adequate attention was not given to those subjects rated as Probable 
or Possible malingerers, or those subjects whose propensity to exaggerate may be driven 
by internal (i.e. psychological) rather than external (monetary) sources. Finally, the 
nonparametric nature of the data interfered with the ability to carry out additional 
analyses that may have provided more comprehensive information without the burden of 
a very restrictive experimentwise alpha level as was required in this case. In addition, 
small sample sizes in some cases likely reduced the power of the analyses used.  Despite 
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these limitations, the current findings will, hopefully, provide some impetus for future 
research on these, and other, questions regarding the evaluation in this important area of 
neuropsychological practice.  
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Appendix A: Clinical Assessment of Malingering Probability 
 
 
 
A. Presence of substantial external incentive 
B. Evidence from neuropsychological functioning 
1. Definite negative response bias 
2. Probable response bias 
3. Discrepancy between the test data and known patterns of brain function 
4. Discrepancy between test data and observed data 
5. Discrepancy between test data and reliable collateral reports 
6. Discrepancy between test data and documented background history 
C. Evidence from patient self-report 
1. Self-report history is discrepant with documented history 
2. Self-reported symptoms are discrepant with known patterns of brain 
functioning 
 
3. Self-reported symptoms are discrepant with behavioral observations 
4. Self-reported symptoms are discrepant with information obtained from 
collateral informants. 
 
5. Evidence of exaggerated or fabricated psychological (neurocognitive) 
dysfunction. 
 
D. Behaviors meeting criteria from groups B and C are not fully accounted for by 
known Psychiatric, Neurological or Developmental factors.  
 
Absolute Malingering: Meets criterion A and Criterion B1 and Criterion D. 
Probable Malingering: Meets Criterion A and two or more B Criteria (excluding 
B1) and one or more C Criteria.  
 
                                                                 126
       
Possible Malingering: Meets Criterion A and one or more C Criteria, but does not 
meet Criterion D; or, meets all criteria for Definite or Probable Malingering, but does 
not meet Criterion D.  
 
   Not Malingering: May meet Criterion A, but does not meet any B, C, or D Criteria.   
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